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INTRODUCTION 
In the last few decades the United States has been engaged in an 
escalating war against crime. Between 1982 and 2001, the resources 
dedicated by American taxpayers to the justice system have more than 
quadrupled.1 Discounting for inflation, this number reflects a 165% 
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1. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE 
AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2001, at 2 (2004) [hereinafter JUSTICE 
EXPENDITURE REPORT]. It should be noted that these figures include all of the costs of 
upholding the court system and therefore include costs associated with civil litigation as well. 
Nonetheless, unless there has been a disproportionate rise in the expenditure dedicated to 
the civil elements of the justice system these figures should give a general indication as to the 
trends of the expenditures on the criminal aspects of the justice system. 
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real increase in spending,2 as well as an increase in the percentage of 
the American Gross Domestic Product dedicated to the justice 
system.3 At the same time, criminal sanctions in the United States 
have also bee ri  on the rise. The incarceration rate has more than 
tripled, from 139 per 100,000 residents in 1980 to a staggering 476 per 
100,000 residents in 2002.4 This rate of increase is in sharp contrast to 
other Western countries. 5  Finally, in recent years we have witnessed a 
constant decline in the procedural safeguards granted to criminal 
defendants by courts in the United States, which again is in contrast to 
foreign countries.6 
The systematic harshen ing of the American criminal justice 
system 7 is a complex phenomenon lacking a single explanation. 
Rather, it relates to American attitudes toward crime, local crime 
rates, and the partisan politics surrounding criminal law. 8 This Article 
aims to add another piece to this puzzle by pointing out how the 
decentralized structure of the American criminal justice system 
creates a dynamic process in which local communities have an 
incentive to increasingly harshen that system's standards. This 
argument builds on the insights of two parallel lines of literature that 
2. Id. at 1 .  
3. Id. at 3 (noting that, while in  1982 1 . 10% of the American GDP was dedicated to the 
justice system, in 2001 this number grew to 1.66%). These figures also reflect a nominal 
271 % increase in the per capita expenses on the justice system. Id. at 2. 
4. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION RATE, 
1980-2003, at http://www. ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/incrttab.htm (last modified Nov. 7, 
2004); see also David C. Leven, Curing America's Addiction to Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 641, 642-43 (1993) (pointing out the rising prison population in the United States in 
recent decades). 
5. Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So High?, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 
419, 419 (1999). Furthermore, as noted by Professor Luban in 1993, the United States had 
the highest incarceration rate in the world - higher than pre-Glasnost Soviet Union, post­
Tiananmen Square China, and pre-de Klerk South Africa. David Luban, Are Criminal 
Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1749-50 (1993). 
6. See Tonry, supra note 5, at 419-20; see also Louis Michel Seidman, Criminal 
Procedure as the Servant of Politics, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 207, 209 (1995) (stating that 
"judges have virtually gone out of the business of actually policing the voluntariness of 
confessions and regularly sanction the sort of coercive tactics that would have led to the 
suppression of evidence a half century ago"). 
7. A comment on terminology should be made at this point regarding the term "criminal 
justice system." For the purposes of this Article this term is used in order to encompass all 
policy tools that a government can use in order to regulate criminal behavior. The most 
obvious of these tools is the criminal code, which defines which acts are criminal and what 
are the sanctions that are attached to these acts. Yet this term includes additional tools such 
as the expenditures made by the government in order to finance law-enforcement agencies, 
the rules of evidence governing criminal trials, and the rules of criminal procedure. 
8. See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 5.  
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scholars have not yet combined in a complete fashion. 9 The first is the 
jurisdictional competition literature. This line of literature 
demonstrates that under a stylized set of assumptions, competition 
among local governments might lead to efficient levels of taxation and 
of supply of public goods.1 0 In the past few decades this literature has 
covered a wide array of legal fields including corporate law,1 1 
environmental law,12 taxation,13 bankruptcy,1 4 trusts,1 5 and family law. 16 
The common characteristic of these studies is the treatment of the 
different units of a decentralized government as actors who compete 
among themselves to attract desirable types of activity and repel 
unwanted types of activity. 
The second line of literature my argument builds upon is the crime 
displacement literature.1 7 This literature treats the decision of profit­
driven criminals (e.g., car thieves, drug dealers) regarding where to 
commit a crime as a rational decision in which criminals aim to 
9. For an exception, see Richard Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce 
Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 180 (1996), which notes the competitive effects that 
might be created within a federal system of criminal justice. 
10. The initial contribution to this literature should be attributed to Charles Tiebout, A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
11. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 ( 1992); William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Daniel 
R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in 
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, 
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
12. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
"Race-to-the-Bottom " Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1210 (1992); Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, "Facts are Stubborn Things": An 
Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State 
Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55 (1998). 
13. See, e.g. , Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local 
Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 458-61 (1996). 
14. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company 
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom ", 54 
VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001); David A. Skeel, Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994). 
15. See Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000). 
16. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative 
Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995). 
17. Significant early contributions to the study of crime displacement were made by 
Simon Hakim et al., Interjurisdictional Spillover of Crime and Police Expenditure, 55 LAND 
ECON. 200 (1979), and Thomas A. Reppetto, Crime Prevention and the Displacement 
Phenomenon, 22 CRIME & DELINQ. 166 (1976). For reviews of the topic see, for example, 
CRIME DISPLACEMENT (Robert P. McNamara ed., 1994); CRIME SPILLOVER (Simon Hakim 
& George F. Rengert eds., 1981); and RATIONAL CHOICE AND SITUATIONAL CRIME 
PREVENTION (Graeme R. Newman et al. eds., 1997). 
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maximize their expected payo ff from crime. Thus, this literature has 
pointed out that both public measures such as additional police 
activity, and private measures such as building fences, may simply 
cause crime to move from one place to another. 
Combining the insights of jurisdictional competition and crime 
displacement illustrates how the goal of encouraging crime migration 
might drive local communities to gradually harshen their criminal 
justice system. If one jurisdiction raises the price of committing a 
crime within it, either by increasing the sanction or the probability of 
detection, then neighboring jurisdictions become more attractive 
crime targets. This, in turn, will cause these neighboring jurisdictions 
to adjust their sanctions and probabilities of detection in order to 
prevent criminal activity from moving to their communities. Over 
time, these dynamics will cause a decentralized criminal justice system 
to shift toward harsher standards. In other words, while some 
commentators have argued that we are witnessing an arms race 
between law enforcement agencies and criminals,1 8 what we might 
actually be witnessing is an arms race between local communities 
attempting to drive crime to their neighbors. 
From a doctrinal perspective, the analysis presented in this Article 
is closely related to the debate triggered by the Supreme Court 's 
ruling in United States v. Lopez 1 9  regarding the role of the federal 
government in the realm of criminal law.2 0 Thus far, this discussion 
has mainly focused on issues such as the historical limits of 
congressional authority,21 the relative advantages of the federal and 
state criminal justice systems,22 the burden imposed upon the federal 
judiciary,2 3 the potential effects of the federalization of criminal law on 
18. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1523 (2000). 
19. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
20. In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the federal Gun Free School Zones Act 
of 1990 after finding that it exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Id. 
21. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American 
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995). 
22. Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization 
Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 973 (1995) (pointing out the efficiency of having a centralized 
agency which specializes in certain aspects of investigation); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John 
Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 
HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1103-25 (1995) (pointing out some of the functional advantages of the 
federal prosecutorial system). 
23. Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper 
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 983-96 (1994-1995) (arguing 
that the creation of additional federal crimes is undesirable because it overburdens the 
federal judiciary). But see Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 
CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 247, 251-61 (1997) (arguing that additional criminal litigation is 
not creating an excessive burden on federal courts). 
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individual rights,2 4 and the importance of normative diversity in 
criminal law. 2 5  This Article adds to the debate by using a political 
economy perspective to illustrate the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of allowing local communities to control criminal justice 
policies. The theoretical argument presented in this Article leads to 
the conclusion that, contrary to the commonly held view among legal 
scholars, 26 additional federal regulation in the area of criminal justice 
might be desirable to limit the inefficient harshening of that system 
caused by jurisdictional competition. Furthermore, unlike scholars 
who argue that federal intervention should focus on areas in which 
local jurisdictions fail to deal with crime, 2 7  this Article makes the 
counterintuitive argument that in the context of criminal justice, 
federal intervention might be necessary when states are successful at 
reducing crime. 
The Article is organized as follows: Part I introduces the concepts 
of jurisdictional competition and crime displacement and argues that, 
as a positive matter, a decentralized criminal j ustice system may create 
a competitive process among the different units composing it, in which 
each such unit attempts to divert crime to neighboring communities. 
Part II then turns to evaluate the normative aspects of jurisdictional 
competition in the area of criminal justice. In this context I will show 
that competition can have both advantages and disadvantages. On one 
hand, the forces of competition might drive jurisdictions to fight crime 
efficiently, since any jurisdiction that functions inefficiently will suffer 
from a rise in its crime rate as a result of crime displacement. On the 
other hand, jurisdictions might face a collective-action problem in 
which they are spending increasingly high resources on their criminal 
justice s ystem simply to deflect crime to their neighbors. In such a 
case, every jurisdiction 's interests would be served if jurisdictions 
could commit themselves not to compete in the area of criminal 
justice. The second half of Part II examines more closely the problem 
of inefficient competition in the realm of criminal justice, and explores 
different ways to deal with these inefficiencies. Finally, I o ffer 
concluding remarks as well as suggestions for future research. 
24. Beale, supra note 23, at 995 (arguing that a national police force might threaten 
individual liberty). 
25. Brickey, supra note 21, at 1 138-39; see also Koleman S. Strumpf & Felix Oberholzer­
Gee, Endogenous Policy Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic 
Federalism, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2002) (analyzing the diversity of alcohol regulation in the 
United States). 
26. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 23, at 247-48 n.l (reviewing the literature on the issue). 
27. Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1077-
81 (1995). 
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I. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
For the most part, the United States has a decentralized criminal 
justice system. State legislatures define the majority of crimes and set 
out the punishments for those crimes. 28 In addition, the enforcement 
of criminal laws lies, in most cases, in the hands of local law­
enforcement agencies. 29 Furthermore, the officials controlling such 
local agencies are often elected directly by the communities they 
serve. This, in turn, promises the development of policies attuned to 
the preferences of local communities.3 0 Employing the tools of positive 
public choice theory, this Part will evaluate the decisionmaking 
process that units of a decentralized system of government face when 
they design their criminal justice policies. 
A. Jurisdictional Competition 
To model the behavior of the different units within a decentralized 
system of government, one must initially develop a concept of the 
decisions made by these units. In recent years positive public choice 
theory has suggested that we view local units in a decentralized system 
as players aiming to maximi ze their own welfare.3 1 Thus, the 
interactions among these units can be categorized as competitive in 
nature and the tools of game theory can be employed to model the 
expected equilibrium to which those interactions will lead. 
The jurisdictional competition literature can be traced back to 
Charles Tiebout 's article on the topic,3 2 in which he demonstrated that, 
under a stylized set of assumptions,33 competition among local 
28. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (asserting that the states possess primary authority for defining the 
criminal law). 
29. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 128; JUSTICE EXPENDITURE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3 
(presenting data on federal state and local expenditures); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining 
and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2565-66 (2004) 
(pointing out that the federal enforcement bureaucracy is a relatively small player in the 
broader criminal justice system). 
30. This structure should be contrasted with the centralized structure of the criminal 
system in other countries. In Israel, for instance, the bulk of criminal offenses and their 
punishments are defined by a national criminal code. In addition, the enforcement of these 
laws is conducted by a national police force that is controlled by the central government. See 
David Weisburd, Orit Shalev, & Menachem Amir, Community Policing in Israel, Resistance 
and Change, 25 POLICING 80, 82 (2002). 
31. For some general examples of this line of literature see THE NEW FEDERALISM: 
CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997); PAUL E. 
PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS (1986); and DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995). 
32. Tiebout, supra note 10. 
33. Tiebout makes several assumptions within his model. Id. at 419. First, there exists a 
large number of communities. Second, there are no costs associated with moving from one 
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governments might lead to efficient levels of taxation and of supply of 
public goods. 34 While some view the normative aspect of this model 
(i.e., jurisdictional competition is efficient) as controversial, few would 
contest its positive aspect (i.e., competitive incentives drive local 
policies). Since the publication of Tiebout's article, the jurisdictional 
competition literature has spread to a wide variety of legal fields. 35 
Two illustrative examples, which reflect reverse incentives, can be 
found in the areas of corporate law and welfare benefits. In the 
context of corporate law, states have an incentive to attract 
corporations to incorporate within their jurisdiction in order to 
increase their tax revenues. 36 Given the high mobility of corporations 
associated with the relatively low costs of reincorporation, 
corporations will tend to reincorporate in states that offer them a set 
of corporate-governance laws maximizing their value. Thus, states 
wishing to enlarge their tax revenues will attempt to offer corporations 
the most attractive set of corporate-governance rules. In the context of 
welfare policies, on the other hand, the interaction among jurisdictions 
leads to different results. 37 Welfare policies redistribute wealth from 
the rich to the poor. Thus, a state adopting such policies will 
encourage migration of poor people from states that do not have such 
policies. Yet, states generally wish to discourage the influx of poor 
people because such movement decreases the welfare of the state 's 
current residents. Hence, the prospect of migration by the poor will 
make states reluctant to adopt welfare policies as generous as they 
would have been willing to adopt in the absence of such migration. 
My model of the competitive process in the context of criminal law 
builds upon the same insights as the existing jurisdictional competition 
literature. Crime is a negative social phenomenon that imposes several 
costs on the community within which it is committed. First, crime 
jurisdiction to the other. Thus individuals can choose their jurisdiction based on the taxes 
they will need to pay and the public goods (such as police, public schools, etc.) that are 
provided within the jurisdiction. Third, individuals hold perfect information as to the level of 
taxation and the level of public goods supplied in all jurisdictions. Fourth, all jurisdictions 
are an optimal size, which means that they have the number of members at which the bundle 
of services can be produced at the minimal average cost. Fifth, communities that are below 
the optimal size seek to attract new residents in order to reach the optimal size. Sixth, there 
are no spillover effects or externalities. This set of assumptions clearly oversimplifies the 
jurisdictional competition picture. For instance, as will be developed in more detail bellow, 
policies adopted with respect to crime control might create negative externalities and not 
fulfill the sixth assumption. 
34. Id. at 421-24. 
35. See supra notes 1 1-16 and accompanying text. 
36. See generally Bebchuk, supra note 11.  
37. For a recent review of the literature on jurisdictional competition in the area of 
welfare policies, see generally Craig Volden, Entrusting the States with Welfare Reform, in 
THE NEW FEDERALISM, supra note 31, at 65. 
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imposes direct costs on the victim.3 8 These costs can be borne by the 
·individual victims of crime or by the community through insurance 
contracts, in which case members of the community will receive an 
accurate monetary measurement of the cost of crime in their 
community. Second, crime affects the location decision of potential 
investors.3 9 Communities with low crime rates attract economic 
investments that increase employment, generate additional tax 
revenue, and enhance welfare. Finally, crime rates affect property 
values in the area where crimes are committed. Generally, 
communities suffering from high crime rates will suffer depreciation in 
their property values and a decrease in wealth.4 0 The final point might 
be of greater importance in the context of jurisdictional competition 
because a significant portion of the tax revenue of localities in the 
United States is tied to the value of local property.4 1 
Given the costs of crime, local communities have an incentive to 
lower their crime rates by adopting polices that will "export" this 
problem to neighboring communities.4 2 This is not to say that policies 
are necessarily tailored with this goal in mind (though as we shall see, 
in some cases they are); rather, jurisdictions facing increased crime 
38. Mark A. Cohen, Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crimes to 
Victims, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 537 (1988) (measuring the costs imposed by crime on 
individuals). 
39. See, e.g., Douglas R. Porter, Reforming Growth Management in the 21st Century: The 
Metropolitan Imperative, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 335, 339 (2001) (pointing out the 
connection between lower crime rates and the shift of economic development to suburban 
and rural areas); Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development 
Corporations in Inner City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 753, 
759 (1996-1997) (noting that high crime rates in inner cities deter firms from locating in 
those communities). In fact, it is quite common for both states and smaller communities to 
point out their low crime rates when they attempt to draw investors. See, e.g. , HAW. DEP'T 
OF Bus., ECON. DEV. & TOURISM, ADVANTAGES FOR HAWAII BUSINESS, at 
http://www.hawaii.gov/dbedt/advantages.html (last visited May 20, 2004); ST. TAMMANY 
ECON. DEV. FOUND., ABOUT ST. TAMMANY PARISH, at http://www.stedf.org/ 
aboutsttammany.htm (last visited May 20, 2004). 
40. Daryl A. Hellman & Joel L. Naroff, The Impact of Crime on Urhan Residential 
Property Values, 16 URB. STUD. 105 (1979); Richard Thaler, A Note on the Value of Crime 
Control: Evidence from the Property Market, 5 J. URB. ECON. 137 (1978). 
41. See Nina J. Crimm, Why All ls Not Quiet on the "Home Front" for Charitable 
Organizations, 29 N.M. L. REV. 1 ,  11 (1999) (pointing out that "the property tax historically 
has been and continues to be the single largest source of revenue for local governmental 
units"); Lee R. Epstein, Where Yards Are Wide: Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone 
Astray?, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 345, 374 n.100 (1999) (noting that in 
Maryland most local governments rely primarily on property taxes); Sharon N. Humble, 
Comment, The Federal Government's Machiavellian Impediment of the States' Collection of 
Property Taxes Through the FD/C's Regulation of Failed Financial Institutions: Does the End 
Justify the Liens?, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 493, 502-03 (1993) (noting that in Texas most local 
governments rely primarily on property taxes). 
42. Ronald McKinnon & Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal Systems, in THE 
NEW FEDERALISM, supra note 31, at 3, 6 (noting that generally states have an incentive to 
export social problems to neighboring states). 
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rates might adopt policies aimed at reducing crime, not realizing that 
as a result, they divert it to neighboring jurisdictions. The policies I 
will analyze in this Article can be categorized into two types. The first 
aims to raise the cost of committing crimes in the jurisdiction in order 
to make it less attractive. The second attempts to expel from the 
jurisdiction individuals who demonstrated that they have a high 
propensity to commit future crimes . In the next two subsections I will 
evaluate these two methods of diverting crime more closely. 43 
B. Displacing Crime 
The first way jurisdictions may shift criminal activity to 
neighboring jurisdictions is by affecting the ex ante decision about 
where to commit certain crimes. Economists view the decision 
criminals make to commit a certain crime as a rational cost-benefit 
analysis. 44 According to this line of thought, criminals evaluate the 
potential gains and costs of a crime and commit the crime only if it has 
a positive expected value. The costs of crime to criminals include the 
opportunity cost of not engaging in legal activities, the time and effort 
dedicated to committing crime, and the expected sanction the criminal 
justice system generates. This expected sanction is composed of the 
probability of detection and the sanction applied to those criminals 
43. In this Article, I will treat crime as a purely negative social phenomenon from the 
perspective of local jurisdictions. This description seems reasonable given the harms of crime 
presented in the text above. In addition, to the extent that crimes such as property crimes are 
efficient in the sense that they transfer property to individuals who derive a higher marginal 
utility from it, these transfers will in most cases be from individuals who are represented in 
the political system to individuals who are not represented in the political system. Thus, from 
a public choice perspective such crimes will continue to be seen as a negative social 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, there might be certain types of criminal activity that could be 
viewed as beneficial from the perspective of jurisdictions. One reason for this might be the 
nature of some types of criminals. For example, white collar criminals might generate a 
substantial amount of tax revenues and as a result jurisdictions might want to adopt policies 
that will attract these types of individuals. A second reason might be associated with benefits 
created by crimes themselves. For example, lenient enforcement of laws regulating the sale 
of alcohol to underaged individuals might generate additional profits for local businesses and 
additional tax revenue for local governments. A closely related category is crimes that 
border on positive types of activities that jurisdictions wish to encourage. For instance, 
corporate criminal activity might be at times closely related to legitimate economic activity. 
If a jurisdiction sanctions such activity too heavily it might discourage individuals fearful of 
mistakenly crossing the criminal line from doing business in that jurisdiction. Finally, some 
jurisdictions might differ as to the concept of what a "harm" is. For instance, if some units in 
a decentralized criminal system enact sodomy laws that cause members of the LGBT 
community to migrate to jurisdictions that did not enact such statutes the latter jurisdictions 
are not suffering from a "negative externality" since they do not see this activity as negative. 
On normative diversity and criminal law, see supra note 25. 
44. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 176-79 (1968) (presenting an analysis of the supply of crime). For a more 
contemporary treatment of the issue, see Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market 
for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (1996). 
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wh o are actually detected. Generally, as the e xpected sancti on rises, 
the net value of c ommitting a crime diminishes and criminals are 
deterred.4 5 
An additi onal dimensi on of the decisi on p otential criminals make 
c oncerns where t o  c ommit their crimes. Arguably, criminals might 
ch oose fr om ·a diverse set of targets, which differ in the e xpected l oot 
value, the c ost of reaching them, the e xpected sancti on ass ociated with 
them, and other fact ors. P otential criminals are e xpected t o  internalize 
all of these fact ors and ch oose the target with the highest e xpected 
value.4 6 In other w ords, h olding everything else equal, criminals are 
e xpected t o  ch oose t o  c ommit their crimes in the area with the l owest 
e xpected sancti on. 
Building on this the oretical framew ork, ec on omists have m odeled 
different aspects of the ge ography of criminal activity and the 
precauti ons taken by crime victims.47 At the same time, crimin ol ogists 
have studied the effects of measures taken by b oth public and private 
act ors aimed at l owering the e xpected pay offs of crime by "hardening" 
p otential crime targets.4 8 E xamples of such measures include p olice 
patr ols, fences, street lighting, and the like. These studies dem onstrate 
that in many cases such measures end up displacing crime t o  
areas where these measures are n ot used. Concrete e xamples of crime 
displacement can be f ound with respect t o  burglary,4 9 r obbery, 50 
45. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 435-41, 
460-63 (3rd ed. 2000) (presenting a theoretical model of criminal deterrence and supporting 
evidence). But see PAUL ROBINSON, DOES CRIMINAL LAW DETER? A BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE INVESTIGATION (2004), at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/32/ (presenting an 
updated critical evaluation of deterrence theory). 
46. Joseph Deutsch, Simon Hakim & J. Weinblatt, Interjurisdictional Criminal Mobility: 
A Theoretical Perspective, 21 URB. STUD. 451, 451 (1984) (noting that "[a] rational criminal 
chooses the various locations in which to operate in order to maximize his expected utility"). 
47. Id. (modeling the spatial decision of criminals); Joseph Deutsch, Simon Hakim, & J. 
Weinblatt, A Micro Model of the Criminal's Location Choice, 22 J. URB. ECON. 198 (1987) 
(same); Scott Freeman et al., The Spatial Concentration of Crime, 40 J. URB. ECON. 216 
(1996) (presenting a model explaining the spatial concentration of crime); Koo Hui-wen & I. 
P. L. Png, Private Security: Deterrent or Diversion?, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 87 (1994) 
(presenting a model of crime displacement); Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to 
Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 123 
(1991) (evaluating the precaution decision potential crime victims make). 
48. See generally supra note 17. 
49. Stephen L. Mehay, Burglary Spillover in Los Angeles, in CRIME SPILLOVER, supra 
note 17, at 67. 
50. Christian Grandjean, Bank Robberies and Physical Security in Switzerland: A Case 
Study of the Escalation and Displacement Phenomena, 1 SECURITY J. 155 (1990). But see 
Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized 
Controlled Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541, 567-69 (1999). 
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sales of illegal narc otics,5 1 gr owing of illegal narc otics,52 and pr ostitu­
ti on.53 
It sh ould be n oted that alth ough the ec on omic and crimin ol ogical 
studies cited ab ove suggest a rati onal ch oice criminals make as t o  the 
l ocati on of their crimes, their evaluati on implicitly f ocuses on 
criminals' sh ort-term decisi ons. In other w ords, these studies accept 
criminals ' place of residence as a given and evaluate h ow their 
decisi ons are affected by specific measures designed t o  l ower crime 
rates.54 Given the meth od ol ogical difficulties of measuring crime 
displacement, that crimin ol ogists have ch osen t o  f ocus on the sh ort­
term effects of this phen omen on sh ould c ome as n o  surprise. 
N onetheless, fr om an analytical perspective one can expect l ong-term 
residence decisi ons made by criminals t o  be generally c onsistent with a 
rati onal ch oice m odel as well. Acc ordingly, given l ong-term expected 
pay offs criminals will shift their permanent place of residence t o  the 
area that maximizes that pay off. 
T o  be sure, tw o clarif icati ons sh ould be made regarding p otential 
criminals ' ge ographic decisi ons. First, s ome crimes are clearly l ocal in 
nature and have little t o  d o  with criminals sh opping ar ound f or 
c ommunities with the l owest expected sancti on. F or instance, one 
c ould n ot reas onably argue that an abusive husband ch ooses the place 
in which he c ommits his crimes acc ording t o  the analysis presented 
here.55 The f ocus of this Secti on, rather, is on criminal activity driven 
by m onetary pr ofits - such as the trade in illegal narc otics, 
51. Rick Curtis & Michele Sviridoff, The Social Organization of Street-Level Drug 
Markets and Its Impact on the Displacement Effect, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT, supra note 17, 
at 155 (presenting a case study of the displacement of drug dealers in Brooklyn); John E. 
Eck, The Threat of Crime Displacement, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT, supra note 17, at 103, 
111-12 (reviewing the literature on displacement and drug enforcement). But see Braga et 
al., supra note 50. 
52. John R. Fuller & James R. O'Malley, Enforcement and Displacement: The Case of 
Marijuana Growing, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT, supra note 17, at 137. 
53. Phil Hubbard, Community Action and the Displacement of Street Prostitution: 
Evidence from British Cities, 29 GEOFORUM 269 (1998); J. Lowman, Prostitution in 
Vancouver: Some Notes on the Genesis of a Social Problem, 28 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 
(1986); Roger Mathews, Developing More Effective Strategies for Curbing Prostitution, 1 
SECURITY J. 182 (1990); Robert P. McNamara, Crime Displacement and Male Prostitution in 
Times Square, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT, supra note 17, at 121. 
54. Some studies have taken criminals' place of residence as a given, explicitly, and 
measured different aspects of crime with respect to this given place of residence. See, e.g. , T. 
S. Smith, Inverse Distance Variations for the Flow of Crime in Urban Areas, 54 Soc. FORCES 
802 (1976) (finding that one-half of the offenders committed their crimes within two miles of 
their homes); S. Turner, Delinquency and Distance, in DELINQUENCY: SELECTED STUDIES 
11 (Thursten Sellin & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds., 1969) (showing that three-quarters of 
juvenile offenders committed crimes within one mile of their home). 
55. See, e.g., John P. Mciver, Criminal Mobility, in CRIME SPILLOVER, supra note 17, at 
20, 36 (pointing out that crimes of passion tend not to be displaced). 
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prostitution, and theft - which should be sensitive to the potential 
costs and benefits of relocating. Second, shifting criminal activity from 
one place to another is a costly endeavor that is e xpected to create 
some rigidity in the crime market, and prevent some criminals from 
moving to more profitable crime zones. A criminal who shifts activity 
to another area has to learn the specific law-enforcement practices in 
that area, the location of the potential victims, useful escape paths, 
and connections to other tiers of the criminal world. Such costs mi ght, 
in many cases, create a substantial barrier to crime displacement.56 For 
e xample, drug dealers who are highly dependent on their clientele 
might be deterred from moving to other areas by competing dealers 
who control those areas, or by the fact that they are unfamiliar with 
police enforcement tactics in other are as.57 Thus, it is not surprising 
that studies finding a statistically significant displacement effect also 
find that the magnitude of this effect is relatively small.5 8 
The jurisdictional competition and crime displacement theories 
point out a competitive process jurisdictions might engage in when 
designing key elements of their criminal justice system, such as the 
severity of the sanctions they impose on offenders and the amount of 
resources they dedicate to detecting criminals. Traditional models of 
the political economy of criminal sanctions have focused on what can 
be termed an island economy.5 9 In other words, policymakers in such 
an economy are not affected by the criminal sanctions created in 
neighboring communities, and can design an optimal sanctioning 
regime given the unique cost of deterring crime and the harm caused 
by crime in their specific jurisdiction. Yet once we incorporate the 
insight that the relative size of sanctions in neighboring jurisdictions 
affects criminals' location decisions, the e xisting models cannot 
continue to describe the actual decision policymakers face. Rather, the 
ability to displace crime by raising e xpected sanctions creates the 
potential for a competition among jurisdictions wishing to become the 
least "crime friendly" jurisdiction. From this perspective, jurisdictions 
do not even have to believe that criminals are aware of the nuances of 
the different measu res they adopt. Rather, they might wish to develop 
a general reputation of being a type of jurisdiction that criminals do 
not want to "mess" with. Over time, this process can evolve into a 
competitive cycle in which jurisdictions impose increasingly harsh 
56. See, e.g. , Rene Hesseling, Theft from Cars: Reduced or Displaced?, 3 EUR. J. ON 
CRIM. POL'Y & RES. 79, 87-88 (1995); Reppetto, supra note 17, at 175. 
57. Curtis & Sviridoff, supra note 51, at 164-67 (discussing the lack of displacement in 
the face of additional enforcement efforts in Flatbush given the specific supply conditions in 
that neighborhood). 
58. See, e.g. , Mehay, supra note 49, at 78. 
59. See, e.g. , Becker, supra note 44, at 180-85 (deriving the conditions for optimal crime­
prevention policies). 
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sanctions and spend increasing amounts on policing to enlarge the 
probability of detection. 60 
The policies adopted by local governments to deal with auto theft 
are a concrete and useful example of the process described here. This 
example is useful because of both the characteristics of auto thieves 
and the harm created by auto theft. Auto thieves can be divided into 
two distinct types. The first type steals cars to actually use them either 
for simple joy rides or to get from one place to another. The second 
steals cars to resell them either as a vehicle or to chop-shops, which 
dismantle them into spare parts. While the first type of auto theft is 
local in nature and should not be dramatically displaced, the second 
type of auto theft functions much more like a professional industry 
and, over time, should shift to the geographic area in which the profits 
of crime are maximized. Two characteristics of the harm caused by 
auto theft place political pressure on local governments to prevent it, 
even at the cost of crime displacement. First, auto theft is a rather 
common crime and therefore many constituents will care about it 
when making their voting decisions. Second, auto insurance premiums 
create an explicit price tag that allows residents to compare the ability 
of different jurisdictions to prevent this type of crime. 
During the mid-1980s auto theft was on the rise in the United 
States. 61 This rise was especially felt in Michigan, which held the 
unfortunate title of the state with the highest auto theft rate in the 
nation. 62 Increasing inconvenience and rising insurance premiums 
eventually led the Michigan legislature to act, and in 1986 it created 
the Michigan Auto Theft Prevention Authority (ATPA). 63 The 
60. Given the argument made in the text one would expect that state sanctions will be 
higher than federal sanctions for similar crimes. The reason for this is that unlike the states, 
the federal government is expected to internalize crime across states and not have a 
preference to drive crime across state lines. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that generally 
federal punishments are more severe than state punishments for similar crimes. See Beale, 
supra note 23, at 998. Yet this phenomenon should not be viewed as evidence contradicting 
the argument presented here. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction the federal government 
tends to exercise its power over a very small subset of cases. Id. at 981. Thus, the federal 
government does not design its criminal sanctions in these cases as if it were the sole 
regulator of behavior, but rather realizes that the brunt of the responsibility will be carried 
out by the states. Because of this structure the federal government can afford to impose the 
severe sanctions it chooses to impose. Furthermore, one could question whether "similar" 
crimes selected by federal prosecutors are in fact similar to those that are left to the states. 
Federal prosecutors might be selecting cases, which, while from a technical legal perspective 
are similar, represent distinct fact patterns that are more severe. 
61. MICHAEL R. RAND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 
1973-95, at 4 (1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv73-95.pdf. 
62. MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE THEF T  PREVENTION AUTHORITY, 2004 ANNUAL 
REPORT 4 [hereinafter MICHIGAN 2004 REPORT], available at http://www.michigan.gov/ 
documents/2003_Annual_Report_84040_7.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
63. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.6103 (2001). 
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Michigan ATPA includes representatives of law enforcement, auto 
insurance purchasers, and the auto insurance industry. 64 Its goal is to 
fight auto theft in the state by funding police, prosecutorial, judicial, 
and private initiatives aimed at the reduction of auto theft. 65 The 
activities of the Michigan ATP A are funded by a one-dollar surcharge 
added to the price of auto insurance policies in the state. 66 
The creation of the Michigan ATP A gave law enforcement 
agencies in Michigan a boost in their war against auto theft from two 
perspectives. First, this initiative allocated additional resources to 
fighting auto theft, which helped raise the probability of detection and 
the ability to prosecute car thieves. Second, the authority allowed 
some law enforcement agents across the state to deal exclusively with 
auto theft. This, in turn, allowed these agents to specialize in the field 
and become more effective in auto theft prevention. These advantages 
brought a sharp decline in the Michigan auto theft rate in the years 
following the creation of the state's ATPA, despite a continued rise in 
the national level of auto theft. 67 Yet at least part of the success of the 
Michigan ATP A might be explained by crime displacement. Local car 
thieves facing an enhanced expected sanction in Michigan chose to 
shift their activity to neighboring states "like cockroaches fleeing a 
fumigated home." 68 Neighboring states, facing an increase in their auto 
theft rates, 69 either adopted similar measures or felt the consequences 
of becoming more attractive crime targets. 70 As one Milwaukee police 
detective put it, "[w]e've seen auto theft decrease in Michigan after 
they passed a new bill. Then we saw it decrease in Illinois later when 
64. Id. § 500.6103(3). 
65. Id. § 500.6107(3). 
66. Id. § 500.6107(1). 
67. In each of the five years following the creation of the Michigan ATPA, Michigan 
experienced a decline in auto theft, while in each of these years the national amount of auto 
theft increased. See MICHIGAN 2004 REPORT, supra note 62, at 11. Between the years 1986 
and 2002 auto thefts in Michigan decreased by 32% while the national thefts increased by 
2%.Id. 
68. Vicki Contavespi, Auto Suggestions, FORBES, Dec. 19, 1994, at 336 (quoting Rene 
Monforton, the director of claim services for AAA Michigan); see also Tom Held, Auto 
Thefts Soar 12I% in Wisconsin, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 5, 1993, at lA (pointing out 
that the aggressive anti-theft programs in neighboring states drove thieves to Wisconsin); 
Michigan Authority Helps Clamp Down on A uto Thefts, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 7, 1994, at 9B 
(reporting that tough auto theft laws in Michigan and Illinois are driving auto thieves to 
Indiana); Neil D. Rosenberg, 2 Similar Plans Fight Auto Theft, Each Other, MILWAUKEE J., 
July 12, 1993, at Bl (detailing the displacement of car thieves to Wisconsin as a result of anti­
theft programs in neighboring states). 
69. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, CRIME IN ILLINOIS 13 (1998) (noting that auto theft in 
Illinois peaked in 1990); WISCONSIN OFFICE OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, CRIME AND ARRESTS 
IN WISCONSIN 64 (1998) (showing that motor vehicle theft in Wisconsin rose during the late 
1980s and peaked around 1991-1992). 
70. In 1991 Illinois created the Illinois Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Council. See 20 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 4005 (1992). 
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they passed a bill . . . .  What we have are professional thieves moving 
to different states from Michigan to Illinois to Wisconsin."71 The same 
phenomenon seems to have taken place in other parts of the country.72 
Thus, we can see how one state's initiative eventually drove other 
states across the country to adopt similar (costly) programs. 
Several additional points should be noted when viewing the 
competition among states in the context of auto theft prevention. 
First, some legislatures seem to be especially attuned to the possibility 
of crime displacement and require their ATP A to deal mainly with the 
type of auto theft that can be displaced to other states, namely, auto 
theft driven by economic incentives. For instance, out of the six 
potential activities for the ATPA enumerated by the Michigan 
legislature, the top four deal exclusively with "economic automobile 
theft."73 
Second, one can identify a rise in the effective sanction auto 
thieves faced.74 In the past, the prosecution of auto thieves was of 
71. Kevin Harrington, Auto Theft Up 25% as Thieves Strike 40 Times a Day, 
MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 16, 1992, at Al (quoting Milwaukee Police Detective Peter Simet). 
72. The market for stolen cars in the southwest part of the nation is unique since a large 
part of it relies on transporting the stolen cars to Mexico. From that perspective states such 
as Texas, Arizona and California are competing over deterring away this type of unique auto 
theft. Initially, Arizona under-funded this effort and did not fund its auto theft prevention 
authority with mandatory surcharges. See infra notes 81-83. This, in turn, led to the 
displacement of auto theft activity to Arizona. See Arizona Soars to 4th in Auto Thefts, 
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Feb. 9, 1995, at 3B (reporting the rise in auto thefts in Arizona relative 
to other border states); Miriam Davidson, Arizona Auto Theft Moves Into Fast Lane, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 24, 1995, at 3 (reporting that "[c]ar thieves are flocking to 
Arizona from neighboring California, which has cracked down on car theft"); Howard 
Fischer, State at Top of Stolen Car List, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, June 13, 1995, at IA (noting that 
crackdowns in California and in Texas have left Arizona as the only viable border state left 
for auto thieves). Eventually, these trends forced the Arizona legislature to provide for 
larger funding for the state's ATPA. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41-345l(J) (West 2004) 
(creating a mandatory surcharge of fifty cents); see also Guillermo Contreras, Duke City 
Auto Thefts Set Record, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 27, 1998, at Al (EI Paso police recognizing 
that its aggressive attack on auto thieves squeezed some of them elsewhere}; Deborah 
Sharp, Crackdown is Making a Dent in Car Thefts, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 1997, at 4A 
(reporting that the crackdown on auto theft in large metro areas "created a boomlet of 
stolen cars in states such as Utah"). 
73. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.6107(3)(b) (2001}; see also CAL. INS. CODE§ 1872.8 (West 
1993) (focusing on economic auto theft}; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN . art. 4413(37), § 8 
(Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (same). But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-3451 (West 2004) 
(giving no distinction between economic auto theft and other types of auto theft}; 20 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 4005 (1992) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 326 (West Supp. 2004} (same). 
74. The term "effective sanction" refers to the actual sanction auto thieves face. See 
supra text accompanying notes 44-46. It should be noted that the problem of crime 
displacement did at least create public debate regarding the desired level of sanctioning for 
auto thieves. See Contreras, supra note 72 (quoting Deputy District Attorney Richard 
Bowman stating that the penalties for swiping vehicles are not strict enough); Rosenberg, 
supra note 68 (reporting on a suggested bill to increase the penalties on auto theft in 
Wisconsin); Wayne Thompson, Every 30 Minutes, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 12, 1994, 
at Gl (pointing out the low sanction for auto theft in Oregon as one of the causes of high 
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relatively low priority.75 Thus, these thieves faced a low, if not 
nonexistent, effective sanction. To change this situation and deter auto 
thieves, A TPAs began funding prosecutors dedicated exclusively to 
the prosecution of auto thieves.7 6 The activity of these prosecutors 
increased the number of auto thieves actually charged and convicted.77 
Other ATP As attempted to deal with this issue by assisting the judicial 
branch. In Tarrant County, Texas, local authorities created a 
specialized impact court to deal exclusively with auto theft cases.7 8 The 
creation of this court ensured that auto thieves would actually be 
punished :ind thus assisted in deterring auto theft.79 Over time, the 
impact court was so effective in deterring auto theft that its services 
were no longer needed. 8 0  
Finally, one can observe the competitive nature of the decision 
states make as to the funding of their ATP As. In Arizona, the ATP A 
was initially funded on a voluntary basis, without mandatory 
surcharges like those employed by nearby California and Texas. 81 This, 
in turn, put Arizona at a competitive disadvantage in its effort to deter 
auto theft. 82 Yet by 1997, the movement of car thieves to Arizona 
theft rates); Sheba R. Wheeler, Colorado Auto Theft Leaps 24%, DENVER POST, Nov. 15 
2002, at Al (noting that "authorities say they can't combat the crime without tougher 
penalties"). 
75. See, e.g., MARYLAND VEHICLE THEFT PREVENTION COUNCIL, 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 9 (2003) [hereinafter MARYLAND 2002 REPORT], available at 
http://www.mdautotheft.org ldocuments/2002annualreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) ("In 
the past, the prosecution of vehicle theft cases had a relatively low priority."). 
76. See, e.g., ARIZONA AUTOMOBILE THEFT AUTHORITY, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 17 
[hereinafter ARIZONA 2003 REPORT], available at http://www.aata.state.az.us/pdfs/2003%20 
ANNUAL %20REPORT.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005); MARYLAND 2002 REPORT, supra 
note 75, at 9. 
77. See, e.g. , ARIZONA 2003 REPORT, supra note 76, at 18 (pointing out that due to the 
activity of specialized prosecutors in 2003 the amount of auto theft cases filed rose from 304 
to 558 and the number of convictions rose from 221 to 319). 
78. See generally John Council, Tarrant Judges Hijack Prized Auto-Theft Impact Court, 
12 TEX. LAW., July 22, 1996, at 2. See also Wheeler, supra note 74 (noting that auto theft 
charges have been filed in the municipal court where they expect harsher sanctions). 
79. See Council, supra note 78, at 2 (quoting the commander of the local auto theft task 
force stating that the sanctions created by the impact court were a big factor in the reduction 
of auto theft in the area); Jack Douglas Jr., Commissioners Seek Grant to Keep Auto Theft 
Court, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, May 29, 1996, at 8 (noting that local police and 
district attorney attribute the decline in auto theft in the area to the activity of the impact 
court); Renee C. Lee, Officers Honored for Curbing Tarrant County Auto Thefts, FORT 
WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Aug. 18, 1994, at 21 (noting that shifting auto theft prosecution 
to the Tarrant County impact court raised the sanctions auto thieves faced). 
80. See Council, supra note 78, at 2. 
81. CAL. INS. CODE § 1872.8 (West 1993) (imposing an annual fee of up to one dollar); 
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(37) § 10 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). 
82. Davidson, supra note 72 (noting the lack of funding for the local ATPA as one of 
the reasons for the rising auto theft rate). 
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drove the state's legislature to adopt a surcharge scheme.s3 On the 
other hand, in Maryland a cut in the funding of the local ATP A 
brought about a significant increase in the auto theft rate.84 This, in 
turn, led to public pressure to raise the amount of resources dedicated 
to the state's ATPA.ss 
A second example of displacing crime can be found in the context 
of three-strike laws. In general, under these laws offenders convicted 
for the third time of certain crimes are subject to harsh mandatory 
sanctions.s 6 Adoption of these laws created a large discrepancy in 
sanctions between different states. An offender who already has two 
strikes faces the high third-strike sanction in a state that adopted such 
a law, while he faces a relatively minor sanction if he commits the 
same crime in a state that does not have a three-strike regime. Thus, 
some criminals will find it beneficial to relocate their activity from 
states that adopted three-strike laws to those that did not. 
Anecdotal evidence supports the displacement hypothesis with 
respect to three-strike laws.s7 For example, a study conducted by the 
California Department of Justice found that the state's three-strike 
law had the "unintended but positive consequence" of causing 
parolees to leave the state.ss Furthermore, several public figures have 
explicitly indicated that they support three-strike laws because of their 
83. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-3451(J) (West 2004) (creating a mandatory surcharge 
of fifty cents). 
84. See MARYLAND 2002 REPORT, supra note 75, at 1. 
85. See Jo Becker, Auto Theft Fund Cut Decried in Maryland; Executives Petition to 
Keep Programs, WASH. POST, June 12, 2001, at Bl ;  Editorial, Fully Restore Theft Program, 
BALT. SUN, June 21, 2001, at 16A; Del Quentin Wilber, Grant Cuts Concern Police, Auto 
Theft Programs Affected by State's Reduced Funding, BALT. SUN, Aug. 9, 2001, at lB. 
86. For a comparative description of these laws see JOHN CLARK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, "THREE-STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT": A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 6 
(1997). 
87. See Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An 
Analysis of the Case Against California's Three-Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43, 45-46 
(2000) ("Prosecutors in Los Angeles routinely report that 'felons tell them they are moving 
out of the state because they fear getting a second or third strike for a nonviolent offense."' 
(quoting Rene Sanchez, A Movement Builds Against "Three-Strikes" Law, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 18, 2000, at A3)); David LaCourse, Viewpoint, "3 Strikes, You 're Out" Law Proving to 
Be Efficient Crime Fighter, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma), Apr. 3, 1997, at A9 (relaying head of the 
Seattle Police sex offender detail report that as a result of the state's three-strikes law 
seventeen two-strike offenders fled from Seattle to other states); Terry McCarthy, L.A. 
Gangs Are Back, TIME, Sept. 3, 2001, at 46 (noting that "(t]o avoid the mandatory 25-years­
to-life sentence under California's three-strikes-and-you're-out law, gang members with two 
convictions have been moving out of state"); John Painter Jr., Prosecutor Antsy Over 
"Three-Strikes", PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 16, 1994, at B2 (noting that offenders facing 
their third strike might be leaving the state). 
88. OFFICE OF THE ATrY. GEN., CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, "THREE-STRIKES AND 
YOU'RE OUT": ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AFTER 
FOUR YEARS 10 (1998). 
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displacement effect. 8 9  For instance, David LaCourse, one of the 
initiators of Washington's three-strike law, pointed out as one of the 
advantages of the law that "[s]everal criminals from other states have 
said they decided not to move [to Washington] after being told of the 
law."90 Hence, it seems that at least one of the reasons that three-strike 
laws were adopted by many states as quickly as they were is that states 
were compelled to adopt this type of legislation to prevent offender 
migration. 91 
A final example of displacing crime can be found in the area of 
regulatory schemes developed in order to deal with the production of 
the drug methamphetamine ("meth"). In the beginning of 2004 the 
problems associated with meth production were brought to the 
public's attention in Oklahoma when a state trooper was killed in a 
meth-related event. 92 The public outcry caused the Oklahoma 
legislature to intervene, and in April of 2004 it enacted the nation's 
toughest law dealing with meth. Meth can be produced from 
pseudoephedrine, an active ingredient in common cold medicines such 
as Sudafed. The new Oklahoma law created significant barriers for 
individuals attempting to buy pseudoephedrine in order to produce 
meth by moving these drugs behind the counter, limiting the amount 
of pseudoephedrine each individual may buy, and requiring each 
purchasing individual to present a photo ID that would be registered 
by the selling pharmacist. 93 
The new regulatory scheme brought about an immediate decline in 
meth production in the state of Oklahoma. Reportedly, the number of 
meth labs confiscated in the state dropped between March 2004 and 
89. See, e.g. , David Bloom, Wilson Cites "3 Strikes" Results, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 7, 
1996, at 1 (indicating that one of the reasons Wilson supported the state's three-strike law 
was the fact that it caused a decline in the number of parolees from other states moving to 
California). 
90. Lacourse, supra note 87. 
91. Between 1993 and 1995, twenty-four states enacted some type of three-strike 
legislation. CLARK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 86, at 1. To be sure, there 
might be other reasons for the quick adoption of three-strike laws by the different states. For 
example, these laws might be a useful tool to incapacitate and deter dangerous individuals 
and therefore once states learned of this useful tool they rushed to adopt it. See Juan R. 
Ramirez & William D. Crano, Deterrence and Incapacitation: An Interrupted Time-Series 
Analysis of California's Three-Strikes Law, 33 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 110 (2003) 
(measuring the potential deterrence and incapacitation value of the California three-strike 
law). But see Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart J. D'Alessio, "Three-Strikes and You 're Out": The 
Impact of California's New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates, 43 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 457 (1997) (measuring a limited deterrence effect of California's three-strike law). 
92. Matthew Hathaway, Authorities Here Push Plan to Fight Meth by Curbing Sale of 
Cold Pills, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 29, 2004, at Al (noting that the Oklahoma law 
passed as a result of the murder of Trooper Nik Green). 
93. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-212(A)(2) (West Supp. 2005). 
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May of that year by 71 % .94 Yet as might be expected, at least part of 
this decline can be explained by the displacement of criminal activity 
from Oklahoma to neighboring states. In Texas, police officers 
complained that the Oklahoma law was causing crime displacement 
and "ruining" them.95 One Kansas officer described the phenomenon 
more bluntly, and stated "that new law is kicking our butts."9 6 
Furthermore, crime displacement brought about a realization in 
neighboring states that they must adjust their legislation in order to 
keep up with Oklahoma and prevent displacement. In Missouri a local 
police detective noted that: 
What states need to decide now is whether to get on the train that 
Oklahoma let out of the station, or get run over by it . . . .  There's 12 
states that are going to try for Schedule 5 next year. Whoever doesn't 
pass it is (going to) be stuck with a lot of me th cooks. 97 
While in Kansas a spokesperson for the Kansas Bureau of 
Investigation acknowledged that "if all the other states do pass this, 
and you don't, you're going to become a magnet for meth cookers."9 8 
In Texas a senator representing a northern region of the state has 
already introduced legislation similar to the Oklahoma legislative 
scheme in order to stop crime displacement.99 
C. Displacing Criminals 
Thus far, the analysis has focused on creating ex ante incentives for 
potential criminals to conduct their activity in neighboring areas. A 
second way jurisdictions can lower their crime rates is by physically 
removing individuals who have a higher propensity to commit future 
crimes. More specifically, to the extent that a community believes that 
past criminal activity can serve as a reliable proxy for future criminal 
activity, the community might wish to expel individuals with criminal 
records.100 Expulsion can be achieved either by outright forbidding 
94. Ron Jackson, Meth Cases Sink; Pill Law Fuels 70% Fall; Texas Sees Traffic Rise, 
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 22, 2004, at lA. 
95. Associated Press, New State Law Bringing Meth Woes in Texas, TULSA WORLD, 
June 21 2004, at A13 (quoting Police Lieutenant Fred Smith). 
96. Rood Lee, The Drive for Drugs, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 9, 2005, at lA. 
97. Hathaway, supra note 92 (alteration in original). 
98. Steve Painter, End of Bulk Sales of Cold Remedies in Oklahoma Brings Headaches 
to Kansas: Meth Makers Flock Here for Ingredients, WICHITA EAGLE, Dec. 14, 2004, at 1. 
99. Under the Dome, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 11 ,  2005, at SA (reporting on a bill 
introduced by Senator Estes). 
100. There is an abundance of studies showing that individuals who commit certain 
types of offenses are more likely to engage in future criminal activity. See PATRICK A. 
LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS 
RELEASED IN 1994 (2002), available at http:l/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf 
1850 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1831 
certain individuals from living within a defined geographical area, or 
by creating a hostile environment that will eventually drive these 
individuals away. In this context, as was the case with criminal 
sanctions, we can expect to see a dynamic process in which 
jurisdictions adopt increasingly harsh policies aimed at driving these 
individuals away in order to keep up with policies adopted by other 
jurisdictions. Viewed from this perspective, such laws and policies are 
another example of what has become known as Not In My Back Yard 
("NIMBY") legislation, which aims to remove unwanted activities to 
other jurisdictions.1 01 
An example of a policy that literally removes criminals from a 
given jurisdiction is banishment. Historically, banishment has been 
used by jurisdictions to remove unwanted individuals such as sex 
offenders. 1 02 For instance, in ancient India under the Laws of Manu 
the crime of rape was punished by banishment, 1 03 and the Hammurabi 
Code specified this punishment for those convicted of incest.104 
Aristotle noted that "the incurably bad should be banished. "1 05 During 
the eighteenth century the British employed this sanction on a large 
scale by banishing criminals to America and Australia.106 The British 
eventually abandoned this form of punishment only when the 
communities to which the criminals were transported had the political 
power to avoid the imposition of this negative externality.1 07 
(measuring high recidivism rates among released offenders); ALLEN J. BECK & B ERNARD E. 
SmPLEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989) 
(same). 
101. See generally BARRY G. RABE, BEYOND NIMBY: HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING IN 
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (1994) . 
102. See Jason S. Alloy, Note, "158-County Banishment" in Georgia: Constitutional 
Implications Under the State Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 
1083, 1085 (2002) (reviewing the history of banishment and noting that it was reserved for 
"persistent troublemakers"). This is not to say that the sole goal of banishment is prevention. 
Clearly, uprooting an individual from his community reflects a painful punishment that 
creates a deterrent effect. See James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a 
System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 29, 47 (1996) (pointing out the effects of 
banishment on individuals in ancient times). 
103. ISRAEL DRAPKIN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 131 (1989) . 
104. Lindgren, supra note 102, at 48. 
105. THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 271 (W.D. Ross trans., 1986) . 
106. The British referred to the punishment as transportation. See generally A. ROGER 
EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH CONVICTS TO THE 
COLONIES 1718-1775, at 2-3 (1987) (noting that the main goal of transportation was to rid 
Britain of dangerous offenders). 
107. See, e.g. , Benjamin Balak & Jonathan M. Lave, The Dismal Science of Punishment: 
The Legal-Economy of Convict Transportation to the American Colonies, 18 J.L. & POL. 879, 
911-12 (2002) (describing the fall of banishment to America following the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776) . Interestingly, even during the nineteenth century, several European 
countries (mainly Germany) continued to transport their dangerous criminals to the United 
States in covert ways. See Richard J. Evans, Germany's Convict Exports, HIST. TODAY No. 
47(11), Nov. 1997, at 11, 11 .  
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While one might think of banishment as a thing of the distant past 
with little relation to modem crime prevention, in reality, banishment 
is very much a part of the criminal justice system in the United States. 
One way in which courts currently impose banishment on felons is by 
adding it as a condition of probation. For instance, Georgia courts use 
a punishment known as "158-county banishment" under which 
offenders are banished from 158 out of the state's 159 counties, giving 
them an option either to move to a remote county or to leave the 
state.108 According to one Georgia prosecutor, he was personally 
involved with over two hundred cases in which defendants were 
banished to Echols County.109 Though banishment might not be the 
punishment of choice in most criminal cases in the United States, an 
abundance of cases demonstrates that courts in other jurisdictions use 
it as well.11° 
B anishment is also making its way into legislation enacted by 
smaller jurisdictions. The city of Cicero, Illinois, for example, recently 
enacted a gang-free-zones ordinance according to which individuals 
who engage in gang-related activities can be banished from the city.111 
The Cicero ordinance also sets out a procedure for applying the 
sanction, which is less stringent than typical criminal procedure, as it 
allows the admission of hearsay testimony, and requires proof only by 
a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable 
doubt.11 2  Reportedly, soon after the ordinance's enactment, gang 
108. See Alloy, supra note 102, at 1083-85. The reason courts banish these individuals 
from only 158 counties is that the Georgia Constitution forbids the use of banishment from 
the state as a form of punishment. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 'II 21 (stating that " [n]either 
banishment beyond the limits of the state nor whipping shall be allowed as a punishment for 
crime"). 
109. Alloy, supra note 102, at 1099. 
110. See William Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its 
Abolition Under the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 
465-75 (1998) (reviewing banishment litigation in the different states). It should be noted 
that in many cases banishment is imposed with the consent of the defendant through the use 
of a plea agreement. Such cases will for the most part not manifest themselves in case law. 
See Alloy, supra note 102, at 1 103. 
111 .  Stephanie Smith, Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing Criminal Due 
Process Requirements?, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1465-66 (2000). It should be noted that the 
Cicero gang ordinance was passed as a civil rather than a criminal remedy. Since the goal of 
this legislation is to deal with criminal activity I view it as part of the criminal justice system 
as I define it, supra note 7. Similar policies were adopted in California in which localities 
used public nuisance injunctions in order to force gang members out of certain areas. See 
Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance 
Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409 (1999). The use of 
these injunctions led over time to the displacement of gang activity from one area to the 
other. Id. at 439-42 (reviewing an ACLU study measuring the displacement effects of the 
injunctions). 
112. Smith, supra note 111 ,  at 1466. 
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members in Cicero began to migrate out of the city. 113 In addition, the 
enactment caught the attention of neighboring communities that 
considered adopting such measures themselves.114 
A closely related topic demonstrating communities ' desire to expel 
unwanted individuals is the transfer of prison inmates between states. 
In recent years a market for inmates has developed in the United 
States, such that states with an insufficient number of prison beds buy 
additional incarceration capacity by shipping their criminals to states 
that have a surplus of prison beds. The transfer of prison inmates 
creates two main problems for the communities receiving them from 
the perspective analyzed in this Article. First, when inmates succeed in 
escaping from prison they create a risk to residents in the immediate 
vicinity. Second, inmates might decide upon their release to stay in the 
state of their incarceration. Not surprisingly, importing prison inmates 
often raises fierce public debates in the affected communities.115 One 
can even see specific legislative proposals intended to protect the 
interests of communities that agree to host prison inmates. For 
instance, in Louisiana, the state legislature proposed to mandate that 
any out-of-state inmate hosted by Louisiana be removed from the 
state prior to his release.11 6 As he put it, "[i]f their first day of freedom 
is walking around the streets of Louisiana, then they might want to 
stay here, and I don't think we want to recruit prisoners."11 7 
A second and more nuanced way jurisdictions can remove 
unwanted individuals is by creating a hostile environment that will 
cause these individuals to leave voluntarily. Jurisdictions can achieve 
this goal by imposing restrictions on the lives of convicted offenders in 
areas such as housing, employment, and welfare benefits. Over time, 
lowering the expected quality of life of offenders may cause them to 
move to jurisdictions that do not have such restrictions. This, in turn, 
could lead to a competitive process in which other jurisdictions adopt 
such restrictions simply to prevent offender migration. In fact, one can 
observe a general trend among states to impose a wide array of 
restrictions on convicted offenders that encompass the most 
meaningful aspects of their lives.11 8 For instance, states routinely use 
113. Id. at 1467. 
114. Id. 
115. See, e.g., Noah Bierman, Private Prisons Might Import Inmates, PALM BEACH 
POST, Apr. 14, 2000, at lA; Phil Manzano, Prison Means Ticket Out of Oregon for Many, 
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 20, 1996, at Bl (reporting of outrage in Texas following the 
escape of an inmate from Oregon). 
116. Capital Bureau, Law Could Ensure Convicts' Return Trip: Politician Fears They 
Would Remain in La., TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 14, 2001, at 2. 
117. Capital Bureau, supra note 1 16. 
118. See Avi Brisman, Double Whammy: Collateral Consequences of Conviction and 
Imprisonment for Sustainable Communities and the Environment, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. 
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their authority to require occupational licenses to limit the 
employment opportunities of convicted offenders. 1 1 9 This general 
picture is consistent with the hypothesis that states are attempting to 
displace individuals who have demonstrated a high propensity to 
commit future crimes.12 0 
One set of policies that can serve the goal of encouraging offender 
migration are criminal registration laws. Generally, under such laws 
convicted criminals are required to register with local police officials, 
and furnish them with certain personal information.121 The registration 
requirement serves as a way to harass local criminals and encourage 
them to leave the jurisdiction.122 Over time, however, as more 
jurisdictions adopt such laws the ability of these laws to encourage 
migration diminishes.123 A concrete and current example of 
registration laws being used to encourage offender migration can be 
found in the context of Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Laws ("SORNLs"), commonly known as Megan's Laws. SORNLs 
were initially enacted to help deal with the recidivism of sex offenders 
by creating sex offender registries and by notifying the public about 
released sex offenders who reside within a given community.124 The 
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Program,125 which describes the minimal 
required registration and notification provisions that each state must 
L. & POL'Y REV. 423, 432-48 (2004) (reviewing collateral consequences of convictions in 
different states); Nora V. Demleitner, "Collateral Damage": No Re-Entry for Drug 
Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1033-47 (2002) (same); Bruce E. May, The Character 
Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's 
Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187 (1995) (reviewing employment limitations). 
119. See Erisman, supra note 1 18, at 432-35; May, supra note 1 18, at 193-205. While 
some limitations, such as limiting the ability of convicted felons to work in accounting, 
pharmacy, and private investigation, can be seen as rational preventative measures, barring 
offenders from positions such as billiard room operator, junk dealer, and engineer seems to 
have little to do with the prevention of future crimes. See Erisman, supra note 1 18, at 433 
(listing limitations on employment of convicted offenders). 
120. To be sure, many of the collateral consequences of criminal convictions were 
initiated by the federal government and in that sense do not reflect policies aimed at 
displacement. Nonetheless, states continue to play an active and independent role in this 
process and use their authority in those areas in which the federal government is not active. 
121. Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over Potential Recidivist, 
103 U. PA. L. REV. 60, 60 (1954). 
122. Id. at 63. 
123. Id. 
124. According to a recent study of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, sex offenders have a 
substantially higher chance than other violent offenders to be re-arrested for a new violent 
sex offense. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sixty Percent of Convicted Sex 
Offenders Are on Parole or Probation (Feb. 2, 1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/press/soo.pr (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
125. 42 u.s.c. § 14071 (2000). 
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enact in order not to lose federal law-enforcement grants, 1 26 sets forth 
the federal framework for SORNLs. Currently, all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted some form of such a law.1 2 7  
SORNLs create a series of adverse effects on the lives of released 
sex offenders. First, some of these laws include legal limitations on the 
lives of offenders in areas such as housing and labor opportunities. 1 28 
In addition, the notification aspects of SORNLs subject sex offenders 
to a wide array of nonlegal sanctions ranging from embarrassment to 
extreme acts of violence.129 States can control, to some degree, the 
level of these sanctions by the type of public notification they adopt. 
For instance, states that choose to conduct public notification by using 
a state website might be able to enhance the adverse effects of 
notification. Viewed from this perspective, SORNLs can be used by 
states to create an adverse environment for sex offenders that will 
drive at least some of them out of the state, or will prevent offenders 
residing in neighboring states from choosing to migrate into the 
state.13 0 
Anecdotal evidence regarding the enactment and application of 
SORNLs supports the analysis presented here. First, one can observe 
a process in which sex offenders tend to migrate to those states with 
more lenient laws. Some law-enforcement officials have been 
reporting that sex offenders engage in "jurisdiction shopping," looking 
for states that have less strict registration and notification 
requirements. For example, the official responsible for Oregon's 
registration program in 1997 reported that "[w]e . . .  get calls and 
letters from sex offenders in other states wanting to know about sex­
offender registration in Oregon . . . .  The express purpose is they're 
126. Id. § 14071(g). 
127. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003). 
128. See ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (Supp. 2004) (establishing a list of limitations on the 
places in which sex offenders may reside); ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (Supp. 2004) 
(prohibiting offenders from working within 2000 feet of a school or a child care facility); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052 (4)(a), (b) (West 2003) (prohibiting property owners from 
knowingly renting a room to level three sex offenders if that owner has an agreement with 
an agency that provides shelter to victims of domestic abuse); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 589(A) 
(2001) (prohibiting offenders from working in business that provides service to children and 
schools); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 590 (West 2004) (prohibiting offenders from residing 
within a 2000-foot radius of any school or educational institution). It should be noted that in 
some cases housing limitations can be used as de facto banishment punishments. See Doe v. 
Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851-52 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (analyzing the effects of the Iowa 
housing limitation). 
129. For a review of these sanctions, see Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An 
Economic Perspective on Megan's Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2005). 
130. To be sure, SORNLs could also raise the probability of detection for offenders 
planning to commit additional sex crimes. Thus, such offenders might choose to shift their 
residence to jurisdictions without such laws since the expected sanction they face in those 
jurisdictions is lower. Viewed from this perspective, SORNLs might also create ex ante 
crime displacement as described above. See supra Part J.B. 
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looking for a state where they don't have to register."131 Similar 
anecdotal information gathered from offenders indicates that they do 
in fact choose to move to jurisdictions that offer them a more lenient 
registration regime. For instance, a convicted sex offender from 
Michigan reportedly moved to New Mexico because its registration 
laws were less harsh than those of other states at the time.132 
Second, comments made during the legislative debates on 
SORNLs show that a desire to deter sex offenders from choosing to 
reside within their jurisdictions motivated at least some of the 
legislatures enacting these laws. For example, a New York 
Assemblyman stated during a discussion on the New York SORNL 
that "the result of this [legislation] . . .  is the fact that a sex offender 
who is going to come out after serving his time might rethink as to 
where he is going to relocate, and I think that one of the results of this 
legislation might be that this guy is going to go out of town, out of 
state, and that's very good for us."133 Similarly, in Tennessee the 
Senate sponsor of the local SORNL, Senator Crow, stated that "we'll 
see sex offenders leaving Tennessee and you won't see them coming 
in."134 In Idaho, the Attorney General who promoted the adoption of 
the local SORNL said, "what these individuals [sex offenders] were 
131. Jennifer Bjorhus, "Megan's Law" May Have Loopholes, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, 
Dec. 7, 1997, at Bl;  see also Brian Coddington, Plan Brands Sex Offenders: Legislation Seeks 
to Name Names, Confine Worst Offenders Indefinitely, SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane), Dec. 
12, 1997, at Bl (reporting that it is "not uncommon for inmates confined in other states to 
call Idaho asking about sex offender registration requirements"); Ed Vogel, State Trying to 
Locate, Evaluate Sex Offenders in County, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Nov. 4, 1997, at 4B 
(reporting that an administrator of the Nevada Criminal History Records Repository 
received numerous calls inquiring about the state's enforcement of its SORNL and that he 
suspected that these calls were made by offenders who were shopping for a state with lenient 
notification policies). 
132. Bob Schwartz, From Mattos to Molesters, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 2, 2002, at El 
(reporting on the case of  David Siebers); see also Elizabeth Kelley Cierzniak, There Goes the 
Neighborhood: Notifying the Public When a Convicted Child Molester Is Released into the 
Community, 28 IND. L. REV. 715, 720 (1995) (reporting on the case of an offender who chose 
to move from Arkansas to Kentucky because the latter did not have a registration 
requirement at the time); Jenny A. Montana, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against 
Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 569, 582 n.56 (1995) 
(reporting on the case of Joseph Gallardo, an offender who moved from Washington to New 
Mexico, a state that did not engage in public notification at the time); Bjorhus, supra note 
131. (reporting on the case of Ralph D. Webb, an offender who committed his offenses as a 
juvenile and chose to move to Alaska in order to avoid registration since Alaska did not 
require juvenile offenders to register). 
133. Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting N.Y. 
Assemblyman Weisenberg). Yet another New York legislator commented that sex offenders 
"are the human equivalent of toxic waste." See id. at 622 (quoting N.Y. Assemblyman 
Tedisco). This comment makes the connection between SORNLs and environmental 
NIMBY regulation self-evident. 
134. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Cutshall v. Sundquist, 529 U.S. 1054 
(2000) (No. 99-1123). 
1856 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1831 
doing was shopping around to see what states did not have sex 
offender registration. "135 
Third, the actual content of the different SORNLs also validates 
the jurisdictional competition hypothesis. As a general matter, the 
hypothesis predicts that over time, states will increasingly harshen 
their SORNLs. Indeed, a survey of new and pending legislation in 
twelve states, in 1998, indicated that states mostly adjust their 
SORNLs to make them stricter.13 6 States have adopted harsher 
penalties for failing to register, enlarged the scope of notification, and 
chosen to apply their legislation in a retroactive manner.13 7 Minnesota 
provides a concrete example. Since 1995, the Minnesota legislature has 
been debating the issue of community notification.U 8 Generally, the 
debate has been much more vigorous than that of other legislatures 
and a number of the proposals made have been rejected.13 9 
Nevertheless, by 2001, the Minnesota legislature realized that the 
state's ten-year maximum period of registration under its SORNL was 
causing offenders required to register for life in other jurisdictions to 
move to Minnesota.14 0 To deal with this, the Minnesota legislature 
amended its SORNL and required certain types of offenders to 
register for life.141 In addition, one can see the concern of legislatures 
over the movement of sex offenders in the registration requirements 
of some states. In most states, registration is triggered by a conviction 
- in a state court or a court of another state - for one of the offenses 
enumerated in its SORNL.142 Yet some states have begun requiring 
135. Coddington, supra note 131; see also Cierzniak, supra note 132, at 720 (noting that 
the Co-Chairman of the Kentucky Attorney General's Task Force on Child Sexual Abuse 
was quoted saying, "[t]here's a lot of things we want our state known for. A safe haven for 
sex offenders isn't one of them."); Joe Darby, Sex Offenders Must Tell Jeff Neighbors, 
nMES-PICA YUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 6, 1996, at 82 (paraphrasing a Louisiana prosecutor 
stating that had out-of-state offenders not been forced to register in Louisiana, "it could 
have made Louisiana a haven for convicted sex criminals from other states"). 
136. See NAT'L CRIM. JUST. ASS'N, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 
NOTIFICATION: PROBLEM AVOIDANCE AND BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION, AND SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION COSTS SURVEY RESULTS 67-69 (1999). 
137. Id. 
138. For a review of the legislative process in Minnesota with respect to notification 
legislation, see Wayne A. Logan, Jacob's Legacy: Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Laws, Practice, and Procedure in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 
1296-1315 (2003). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1316. 
141. MINN. STAT. §§ 243.166(1)(b)(3), (6)(d) (2001). In addition, this legislation was 
likely driven by the minimal requirements set by the Jacob Wetterling Act with respect to 
the duration of registration. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B) (2000) (requiring lifetime 
registration for certain types of offenders). 
142 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100(5) (2004) (defining "sex offender"); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(A) (West 2001) (defining the people required to register under the 
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sex offenders moving from other states to register, even if they do not 
fall within the registration requirements of that state, if the offender 
was required to register under the SORNL of the state from whence 
he came.143 Requiring individuals to register, for the sole reason that 
they moved from a different state, demonstrates that states tailor their 
SORNLs to deal with offender migration. 
Finally, local law-enforcement officials are using community 
notification to remove sex offenders from their communities� For 
example, it has been reported that in Monrovia, California, the local 
police department attempted to drive a sex offender out of town by 
distributing flyers with information about the offender.144 The flyers 
sparked public demonstrations that only managed to force the 
offender to relocate within the town. Subsequently, the police 
department switched to a more proactive method, raising money from 
a private donor to purchase for the offender a one-way plane ticket 
out of town. This case is not an isolated incident.145 
II. REGULATING THE MARKET FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
In the previous Part, I explained the existence of a competitive 
market for criminal justice that is driven by attempts to displace crime 
to neighboring communities. This descriptive insight raises the 
normative question of how the criminal justice system should be 
structured. In this Part, I will discuss the potential benefits and 
problems associated with a competitive decentralized criminal justice 
system. That done, I will turn to focus on the problems that might be 
created by such a system and suggest several policy tools to remedy 
them. 
act); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25 (Supp. 2004) (defining registration requirements); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 1995) (defining registration requirements); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 
582 (2001) (defining the applicability of the act). 
143. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11223 (West Supp. 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 28.723(1)(d) (West 2004). 
144. See Michael Dear & Django Sibley, The One-Way Strategy for Sex Offenders Makes 
Nobody Safe, L.A. nMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at M6. 
145. See Schwartz, supra note 132 (reporting that the police in Toledo, Ohio, furnished a 
sex offender with a bus ticket out of town). It would seem that local judges are also willing to 
take steps to remove sex offenders from their communities. See Richard Cockle, Offender 
May Return to Oregon Hometown, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 14 2000, at C2 (reporting 
that a judge in Nebraska ordered a sex offender to leave the state). 
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The debate over the efficiency of jurisdictional competition is a 
longstanding one in the federalism literature.146 On one side of the 
debate are those who argue that competition among jurisdictions, 
much like other forms of competition, drives them to an efficient 
outcome.14 7 These commentators view jurisdictions as producers of a 
product, namely public goods such as law, and potential residents 
(both real persons and corporations) as consumers of the product.14 8 
The need to attract satisfied taxpaying residents drives jurisdictions to 
meet the preferences of their consumers in an optimal fashion. 14 9 In 
addition, proponents of jurisdictional competition point out that such 
competition may lead to more innovation with respect to public 
policies.15 0 According to this line of thought, local jurisdictions can 
function as "experimental laboratories" for the development of 
beneficial social policies.151 Thus, these commentators argue that 
jurisdictions engage in a "race to the top" that benefits society as a 
whole. The following conclusion is that just as other well-functioning 
competitive markets should not be regulated, neither should the 
jurisdictional one. 
On the other side of the debate are commentators who point out 
the potential adverse effects of jurisdictional competition.152 They 
146. For a review of this debate see, for example, William W. Bratton & Joseph A. 
McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a 
Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997). 
147. See, e.g. , Tiebout, supra note 10. The Tiebout model was later refined in Truman F. 
Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 ECONOMETRICA 
713 (1981), and in Pierre Pestieau, The Optimality Limits of the Tiebout Model, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 173 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 1977). For a more 
contemporary treatment of this line of thought, see Revesz, supra note 12, at 1233-44, and 
THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990). 
148. Tiebout, supra note 10, at 422 ("Just as the consumer may be visualized as walking 
to a private market place to buy his goods, the prices of which are set, we place him in the 
position of walking to a community where prices (taxes) of community services are set."). 
149. Id. at 424. 
150. See, e.g. , Volden, supra note 37, at 78-86. 
151. The term "experimental laboratories" was coined by Justice Brandeis in New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The concept of 
additional policy innovation created by jurisdictional competition has been subject to 
criticism in recent years. First, it has been argued that the desire of politicians to be reelected 
will reduce their incentives to adopt innovative yet risky policies. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 
(1980). Second, assuming local politicians do adopt innovative policies, it is still not clear 
that such policies are applicable to other jurisdictions. See Volden, supra note 37, at 81-86. 
Nevertheless, it would still seem reasonable to assume that more jurisdictional diversity 
leads to more policy innovation. See SHAPIRO, supra note 31, at 85-86. 
152. See, e.g. , Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady 
Path ": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL L. REV. 1447 (1995); 
Saleska & Engel, supra note 12. 
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argue that in many instances jurisdictions face a collective-action 
problem that can be modeled as a noncooperative game such as the 
prisoner's dilemma.153 These situations are characterized by a payoff 
structure in which, despite the fact that aggregate welfare can be 
optimized by adopting cooperative policies, each player has an 
incentive to defect in order to maximize his personal payoff. Since all 
the players anticipate the defection of the other players, they 
eventually reach an equilibrium in which they all choose to defect. In 
other words, the competitive process between jurisdictions can be 
characterized as an undesirable "race to the bottom." Therefore, as is 
the case with collective-action problems, some form of external 
regulation might be needed in the jurisdictional market to reach a 
desirable outcome. 
Note that the two theories of jurisdictional competition are not 
mutually exclusive. In any given concrete context jurisdictions might 
be engaged in both beneficial competition driven by surplus­
generating innovations, and undesirable competition driven by the 
ability to impose negative externalities on neighboring jurisdictions. 
For example, in the area of corporate law, Bebchuk has demonstrated 
that states might be engaged in both a race to the top and a race to the 
bottom.154 While generally state competition in that area promotes the 
creation of corporate-governance rules that are socially beneficial, in 
some concrete contexts, such as those involving negative externalities, 
state competition might yield an undesirable outcome.155 
Evaluating the criminal justice context, one can also discern both a 
potential race to the top and a potential race to the bottom. 
Competition in the area of criminal justice may have a positive effect 
on the way jurisdictions use the resources they dedicate to combating 
crime. In the area of enforcement, incentives created by crime 
displacement may drive local jurisdictions to adopt more cost-effective 
measures to fight crime. Local law enforcement officials who do not 
deter crime effectively and draw criminals to their jurisdiction will be 
driven out of office over time and more successful individuals will take 
their place. In addition, jurisdictions wishing to gain a competitive 
edge will be driven to innovate and create new law enforcement 
techniques. For instance, in the area of auto theft prevention, 
jurisdictions began to encourage car owners to etch Vehicle 
Identification Numbers on the windows of their vehicles, making it 
153. Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 152, at 1470-75; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. 
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 906-07 (1987); Saleska & 
Engel, supra note 12, at 74-76. 
154. Bebchuk, supra note 11,  at 1455-58. 
155. Id. 
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much more difficult to resell stolen cars.15 6 While this type of 
precaution might be efficient in the sense that it cheaply lowers the 
expected value of crime, it is also an observable measure that might 
divert criminals to cars that are not etched. Thus, the prospect of 
displaced crime might have contributed to the development of an 
efficient means to prevent auto theft. 
In the area of sanctioning, competition might drive jurisdictions to 
innovate with respect to how they sanction criminals. Over time one 
can expect that competitive forces will drive communities to converge 
to the most cost-effective form of sanctioning. For example, several 
jurisdictions have recently shifted toward using alternative sanctions 
such as public shaming. 15 7 Arguably, alternative sanctions are a 
relatively cheap way to impose sanctions and deter criminals. 158 Thus, 
jurisdictions using these forms of punishment might develop a 
competitive advantage over jurisdictions not using them, and displace 
crime to those jurisdictions. This, in turn, will drive those jurisdictions 
to adopt more cost-effective ways to punish criminals. In the area of 
prostitution, jurisdictions publicizing the names of the patrons of 
prostitutes have reportedly managed to displace the activity to 
neighboring jurisdictions.15 9 
Thus far, I have focused on the advantages associated with 
jurisdictional competition in the area of criminal justice, but such 
competition might have significant problems as well. Economists have 
argued for many years that the attempts of private actors to displace 
crime lead to inefficiently high investment in crime prevention.160 For 
instance, it has recently been argued that the trend of building gated 
156. See ARIZONA 2003 REPORT, supra note 76, at 16; see also MICHIGAN 2004 REPORT, 
supra note 62, at 5. 
157. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 591 (1996); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A 
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999). 
158. See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 157, at 368 (arguing that "shaming penalties 
could prove to be an efficient alternative to prison for white-collar offenders"); Stephen P. 
Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 738 (1998) (noting 
that "at a time when the costs of imprisonment consume ever larger shares of state budgets, 
shame may serve as a politically viable and cost-effective way of achieving deterrence, 
specific and general, as well as of satisfying the legitimate demands of retribution"). 
159. See Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, 
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 
49 VAND. L. REv. 1525, 1546-47 (1996) (noting that the shaming of patrons might simply 
lead them to relocate to non-shaming areas). 
160. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for 
Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON & ORG. 434, 435 (1995) (arguing that 
individuals will choose levels of private enforcement that diverge from the social optimum); 
Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim 
Centered Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 309-10 (1996) (arguing that investments in 
crime diversion are socially wasteful); Shavell, supra note 47, at 130 (arguing that victims 
might take excessive observable precautions). 
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commumtles in some parts of the country reflects an inefficient 
equilibrium in which too many resources are put into gating.1 61 This 
insight also applies to the design and operation of local criminal justice 
systems. Criminal law is a type of fence a community builds around 
itself that raises the cost of committing crimes. Hence, jurisdictions 
ignoring the negative externalities created by the policies they adopt 
will be driven, over time, to adopt an increasingly harsh criminal 
justice system despite the fact that they would be better off agreeing 
collectively on a more lenient system. 
Perhaps the argument presented here can be best understood by 
analyzing the decision jurisdictions make as to the amount of 
monetary resources they invest in crime prevention. Generally, 
additional resources dedicated to this cause are expected to raise the 
probability of detection, raise the expected sanction, and lower the 
crime rate by either displacing or deterring crime. Thus, when one 
jurisdiction raises its expenditure on crime prevention, its neighboring 
jurisdictions are compelled to raise their expenditure as well in order 
to prevent crime displacement.1 62 Over time this process will drive 
both jurisdictions to invest an inefficiently high amount of resources in 
crime prevention.1 63 This conclusion can be applied in a 
straightforward fashion to the decision jurisdictions make as to the 
severity of the legal sanctions they impose on criminals. Generally, 
imposing harsh criminal sanctions reflects an additional expenditure 
for the local criminal justice system.1 64 Communities unable to commit 
to an agreed sanctioning level will be driven to adopt increasingly high 
sanctions due to the prospect of crime displacement. 
To be sure, investing additional resources to increase the 
probability of detection and incarceration of criminals will also 
generate positive externalities.1 65 Apprehending and prosecuting a 
criminal who commits crimes in several jurisdictions lowers the crime 
rate in all those jurisdictions if it deters the apprehended individual 
161. Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Gated Communities and the Economic 
Geography of Crime, 46 J. URB . ECON. 80, 94 (1999). 
162. Hakim et al., supra note 17, at 201-06; Uriel Spiegel, Economic Theoretical View of 
Criminal Spillover, in CRIME SPILLOVER, supra note 17, at 48, 49-53. 
163. Spiegel, supra note 162, at 53 (noting that this process will lead communities to act 
in a way that is not optimal). 
164. In some unique cases raising sanctions might actually lower the cost of 
administering the justice system. If, for instance, the threat of large sanctions assists 
investigators in persuading criminals to cooperate and testify against fellow criminals this 
could lower the costs of investigations. For the duration of the Article I will focus on the 
more intuitive case in which harsher sanctions reflect higher costs. 
165. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 667 (6th ed. 2003) 
(pointing out that states will have suboptimal incentives to deal with criminals who operate 
in several states). 
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from committing future crimes.166 Similarly, incapacitating a criminal 
through incarceration lowers the crime rate in all the jurisdictions 
victimized by the criminal at hand. Viewed from this perspective, 
jurisdictions might have insufficient incentives to invest in crime 
prevention since they will try to free-ride on the efforts of neighboring 
jurisdictions. A complete evaluation of the efficiency of jurisdictional 
competition in the context of criminal justice will have to take these 
positive externalities into account. 
In more general terms, the analysis presented here can be applied 
to all aspects of the criminal justice system that affect the expected 
sanction potential offenders face. Jurisdictions adopting evidentiary 
rules that exclude evidence useful to the prosecution, or procedural 
rules that create a significant burden on the police, will become more 
attractive crime targets and criminals will choose to shift their activity 
to them. In these contexts, the cost of imposing harsher criminal 
standards need not be encompassed in monetary terms and can be 
seen as the disutility caused by adopting legal rules that conflict with 
the moral values of a community, such as privacy. Hence, we might 
expect to see jurisdictions converging over time toward limiting 
defendants' rights despite the fact that at least some of these 
jurisdictions would prefer to grant defendants additional rights that 
would better reflect their moral values. 
The use of legal means such as banishment to remove individuals 
with a high propensity to commit future crimes poses a more complex 
policy question. On one hand, such policies create negative 
externalities to neighboring jurisdictions, and thus states might use this 
type of punishment excessively. On the other hand, such forms of 
punishment might be a cost-effective way to punish criminals. If so, 
states might be willing to agree to a multilateral banishing regime that 
will allow them to reduce the amount of resources they spend on 
incarceration. Such a regime could be based, for example, on a tax 
paid by states to a common fund for each criminal they banish. If this 
tax equals the size of the negative externality associated with 
166. In addition, it has been suggested that deterring crime in one area might create a 
general deterrence effect in neighboring areas. See, e.g., Ronald V. Clarke & David 
Weisburd, Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of 
Displacement, in 2 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 165-83 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1994). The 
main mechanism Clarke and Weisburd identify in their review is the creation of uncertainty 
in the minds of criminals as to the extent of crime-prevention measures. For example, they 
refer to the well-documented positive externalities created by using concealed tracking 
devices in cars to deter auto theft, and the use of caller ID services by a small group of the 
population to deter obscene phone calls. Id. at 174-76. The positive externalities created by 
concealed crime-prevention measures have been noted and formalized in the law and 
economics literature. See, e.g. , Shavell, supra note 47. Yet criminal law, almost by definition, 
is an observable crime-prevention measure. Thus, it is unlikely that the mechanisms 
described by Clarke and Weisburd are applicable in this context. 
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banishment, it will function as a Pigouvian tax and assure that 
banishment punishments will be used efficiently.1 67 
Analyzing policies that attempt to drive convicted offenders away 
by creating a hostile environment, such as the use of SORNLs in the 
context of sex offenders, also yields inconclusive results. On one hand, 
states might find themselves in an escalating arms race to create 
relatively harsher policies in order to drive offenders away, as in the 
case of criminal sanctions. For instance, while public notification 
conducted door-to-door by police officers might not be an efficient 
way to conduct notification, states might find it to be an effective (yet 
costly) way to drive offenders out of the state. Meanwhile, other states 
that find some aspects of SORNLs to be problematic because they 
conflict with other values they cherish, such as forgiveness and 
compassion, might find it difficult to protect those values without 
attracting sex offenders into their community. On the other hand, 
jurisdictional competition with respect to the treatment of convicted 
offenders might drive states to develop more efficient programs 
dealing with these individuals. For example, using the Internet to 
disseminate information about sex offenders clearly has some 
efficiency advantages as a mode of transferring updated information 
cheaply to large populations. A final determination of the type of race 
states are engaged in with respect to the treatment of convicted 
offenders requires additional examination, but at the very least the 
potential exists for a race to the bottom in this area. 
Finally, it should be noted that several constraints limit the race to 
the bottom jurisdictions might be engaged in. First, since raising the 
expected sanction creates additional costs, such as the cost of 
additional policemen and the cost of incarceration, these costs will 
constrain the decisions jurisdictions make. At some point, 
communities will find the trade-off between the investment in crime 
displacement and the investment in other social goals to tilt the 
balance towards other causes. Second, deterrence is not the only goal 
that affects the design of criminal law. Values such as retribution and 
fairness obviously play a significant role in shaping criminal sanctions. 
Eventually, these values will conflict with the incentives created by 
crime displacement and stop the process described herein. Thus, while 
cutting off the hands of all individuals convicted of stealing a candy 
bar might be an effective way to displace crime, the moral values of 
communities would probably prevent them from adopting such a 
policy. 
167. The term "Pigouvian tax" follows from A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE (1948). For a recent review, see ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 354-56 (1995). It should be noted that, as a practical matter, 
setting the Pigouvian tax at the required level might be a difficult task for policymakers. 
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In sum, it is difficult to give a conclusive answer to the question of 
whether jurisdictions are engaged in a race to the top or a race to the 
bottom in the criminal justice context, since such a determination 
requires additional information regarding the concrete policies at 
hand. Nevertheless, there are at least some cases that arguably reflect 
inefficient races to the bottom, in which social welfare could be 
enhanced by assisting jurisdictions to cooperate. In the next section, I 
will turn to evaluate ways to deal with those situations. 
B.  Resolving the Potential Race to the Bottom Problem 
1. Local Solutions 
A good place to begin analyzing the potential solutions to the race 
to the bottom problem is the local jurisdictions themselves. After all, if 
jurisdictions are situated in a noncooperative inefficient deadlock, 
they have the most to gain from resolving the problem and reaching a 
cooperative outcome. Jurisdictions have two ways of overcoming 
problems associated with inefficient competition, namely, informal 
and formal cooperation. I will begin by evaluating the former. 
The race to the bottom hypothesis is based on the claim that when 
jurisdictions set policies in the context of criminal justice they are 
situated within a noncooperative game such as the prisoner's dilemma 
and therefore cannot cooperate. Yet this result rests on the set of 
assumptions that define these games. More precisely, the setting of a 
prisoner's dilemma includes three explicit assumptions that make 
cooperation difficult. First, it assumes that the participants are one­
shot players. Second, it assumes that the players make a single 
simultaneous unobservable decision rather than multiple staggered 
observable decisions. Finally, it assumes that the players cannot 
communicate among themselves prior to making their choices. Yet 
these assumptions do not adequately describe the situation of local 
jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are entities with an infinite life span that 
interact with each other on a regular basis.168 These interactions allow 
for constant communications, which enable the evolution of a 
cooperative relationship. Furthermore, legislation and public policies 
are transparent in nature and therefore jurisdictions can observe each 
168. To be sure, despite the fact that jurisdictions have an infinite life span, individual 
policymakers, namely elected politicians, do not. As such politicians approach the end of 
their political life they might adopt end-game strategies and behave in a noncooperative 
manner. The end-game problem has been well documented in the norms literature. See, e.g., 
ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 267-
68 (1991) (analyzing the demise of cooperation among the Ik of northern Uganda in an end­
game situation). On the other hand, one should note that bureaucrats with long-term tenure 
tend to have a significant influence on public policies. Thus, jurisdictions might actually be 
some kind of intermediate entity, which can sustain long-term cooperation subject to short­
term opportunism by politicians. 
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others' actions. Given these characteristics, one can expect that some 
form of voluntary cooperation might emerge between jurisdictions to 
avoid the inefficient results associated with noncooperative behavior. 
Just as norms may serve as an alternative to formal law in solving 
collective-action problems among individuals and small groups, local 
jurisdictions may develop means of cooperation without resorting to 
formal regulation.1 69 In fact, some commentators have pointed out that 
despite potential incentives to defect, jurisdictions in many cases 
behave in a cooperative manner.1 7 0  In the context of law enforcement, 
one can find an abundance of examples of local police departments 
assisting each other in a cooperative fashion rather than engaging in 
opportunistic defections.1 71 This type of behavior is consistent with a 
general norm of cooperation among jurisdictions. 
A second way local jurisdictions can deal with the race to the 
bottom problem on their own is by formal legal means. Jurisdictions 
may enter into formal agreements in which they commit themselves to 
behave in a cooperative manner. Currently, nearly two hundred 
compacts regulate different aspects of state relationships ranging from 
environmental policies to taxation. 1 72 Voluntary compacts can be a 
useful means of solving some of the collective-action problems 
jurisdictions face in the area of criminal justice as well. For example, 
the field of parolee and probationer supervision closely resembles the 
field of sex offenders analyzed above since it also deals with 
individuals whom states are happy to drive away. To overcome the 
problem, states voluntarily entered into a compact that regulates their 
behavior in this area.1 73 The compact created a commission that 
169. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 73-87 (1984) 
(describing the emergence of cooperative norms between enemy soldiers in World War I 
that were situated in a repeated game); ELLICKSON, supra note 168, at 280-86 (describing the 
emergence of cooperative norms in Shasta County that functioned as an alternative to 
formal law). 
170. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 6 (noting that states tend to cooperate among 
themselves in many of the cases). 
171. See Mary Jean Babic, Car-Theft Program Could End, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 
8, 1992, at C3 (reporting on a visit of Florida officials to Michigan to learn about the 
Michigan ATPA); Julie Bykowicz, New Lines of Jurisdiction Trend: Police Departments Are 
Increasingly Pooling Resources to Fight Crime More Ef iciently, BALT. SUN, Aug. 13, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 4875842 (describing cooperation among local police departments in 
Maryland); James Vaznis, City Guards Against Gang Culture's Spread: "Tha Fam" Faces 
Drug Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2003, at 4 (reporting on cooperation between New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts police departments with respect to gang activity). 
172. See Council of State Governments, Interstate Compact Statutes, at 
http://www.csg.org/CSG/Programs/National+Center+for+Interstate+Compacts/statutes.htm 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
173. Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Adult Offenders, available at 
http://www.adultcompact.org/about/history/historical/Compact_Preamble.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2005). The field of parolee and probationer supervision had been governed by the 
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enacted rules to govern the transfer of offenders from one jurisdiction 
to the other.174 Similarly, the states involved are moving toward 
adopting a compact regulating the area of juvenile offenders.175 
2. Central Planners 
The force driving the inefficiencies associated with crime 
displacement lies in the ability of jurisdictions to externalize a negative 
phenomenon to neighboring jurisdictions. A common solution to 
externality problems is the use of a central authority that takes into 
account all of the externalities and aims to maximize the aggregate 
welfare of society. For instance, in the context of state policies that 
create negative externalities, federal intervention is a possible 
solution.17 6 Similarly, counties and cities creating negative externalities 
could be regulated by states. 
In recent years federal involvement in the area of criminal justice 
has increased substantially. This increase can be observed in the 
enlargement of the scope of federal criminal law, in the added criminal 
litigation in the federal court system, and in the rise of the relative size 
of the federal expenditure on criminal justice.1 7  Generally, legal 
scholars have criticized this trend. 1 78 While some of the current trends 
Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers since 1937. Recently, 
that compact was substituted by the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. For 
updated information on the new Compact, see INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR ADULT 
OFFENDER SUPERVISION, HISTORY, at http://www.adultcompact.org/about/history/default. 
shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). For a review of the Compact, see James G. Gentry, The 
Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision: Parolee and Probationer Supervision 
Enters the Twenty-First Century, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2001). 
174. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION, RULES (effective 
Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://www.adultcompact.org/about/history!h_docs.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
175. The Interstate Compact for Juveniles, available at http://www.csg.org/NR/ 
rdonlyres/elcsssvesx6hlen2wcr32mq6kw36yeujobpmxyyd2wnrvs4r3qy5fzpqbz47o7rxvn3hkxz 
2gqpfdizpl3isgqxhxlg/Interstate+Compact+for+Juveniles.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). The 
Compact requires that 35 states adopt it before it becomes binding. Id. Art. X. As of March 
2005, twenty-three states have enacted laws adopting the Compact. See COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR JUVENILES, at http://www.csg.org/CSG/Policy/ 
public+safety+and+justice/interstate+compact+for+juveniles/default.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2005). 
176. SHAPIRO, supra note 31, at 44-50 (arguing that a strong national authority is 
needed in the presence of externalities); McKinnon & Nechyba, supra note 42, at 8-9 
(discussing mobility externalities among states). 
177. JUSTICE EXPENDITURE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (reporting an increase in the 
relative size of the federal expenditure on the justice system between 1982 and 2001); Beale, 
supra note 23, at 983-96 (evaluating the burden on the federal judiciary); Stephen 
Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing the Federalization of Criminal Law, 
79 MINN. L. REV. 455, 461-65 (1994) (describing the recent "explosion" in federal criminal 
legislation). 
178. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 26. This criticism goes hand in hand with a more 
general view that is prevalent in the federalism literature according to which the federal 
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in federal criminal legislation have little to do with preventing 
undesirable jurisdictional competition, this Article does point toward 
the conclusion that the federal government could have an important 
role as a regulator of the states in the area of criminal justice. 
According to this line of thought, the federal government should help 
states achieve uniformity in their expected sanctions with respect to 
crimes that tend to be displaced.17 9 This type of federal regulation 
might seem counterintuitive since it requires intervention when states 
succeed rather than fail to deal with crime. 
One way the federal government could assist states is by creating a 
uniform federal criminal code dealing with displaceable crimes that 
states would be encouraged to adopt. To the extent that states would 
be reluctant to adopt such a uniform code, the federal government 
might need to ensure that such a code preempts state criminal 
legislation with respect to the crimes that it covers.1 8 0  In the area of 
enforcement, the federal government should focus its attention on 
reducing the incentives for states to spend inefficiently large amounts 
of resources on fighting crime. The federal government could achieve 
this goal by mandating maximum law enforcement expenditures for 
specific types of crimes. Such mandates could allow for efficient 
planning of the amount of resources spent, while sustaining the 
advantages of jurisdictional competition with respect to how to use the 
resources. If such a scheme proves too difficult to manage, 
policymakers will have to consider organizational consolidation, which 
would mean moving law enforcement activity to the hands of a central 
planner such as the FBl.1 81 
A concrete example of organizational consolidation dealing with 
problems of crime displacement is the state ATPAs discussed above.1 82 
On the interstate level, the rise of ATP As can be seen as part of the 
arms race different states are engaged in with respect to auto theft. 
But on the intrastate level the creation of these authorities can be 
viewed as a way to curb competition between neighboring localities 
within a given state that attempt to displace auto theft from one to the 
government has overstepped its bounds in recent years. See THE NEW FEDERALISM, supra 
note 31, at x (arguing that in some areas powers should be given back to the states). 
179. See Neal Kumar Katya!, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2421 
(1997) (noting that uniform criminal penalties can minimize the geographic displacement of 
crime). 
180. Generally current federal criminal legislation creates a concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction and does not preempt state criminal laws. See Susan R. Klein, lndependent­
Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1552 (2002). 
181. See Mehay, supra note 49, at 67-68 (arguing that crime displacement justifies 
consolidating local police departments). 
182. See supra notes 61-85 and accompanying text. 
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other. ATP As are state authorities that aim to reduce auto theft in the 
state as whole and not in any specific county.1 83 Thus, these authorities 
can act as central planners and take into account the potential 
displacement effect of local initiatives. For instance, the Pennsylvania 
ATPA reportedly monitored and dealt with the displacement effects 
caused by its concentrated efforts in Philadelphia.184 
Finally, a more general insight arising from this Article is that the 
federal courts have an important role in the creation of pro-defendant 
rights and regulation of police behavior. Policies regarding search and 
seizure, interrogation methods, the right to legal counsel, and the rules 
of evidence all affect the eventual probability of being sanctioned. 
Thus, jurisdictions may try to displace crime from one to the other by 
limiting defendants'  rights in these contexts even if they would be 
willing to commit to a collective decision to protect these rights. To 
deal with this potential problem, federal courts have a responsibility to 
identify those rights that reflect a long-term national consensus and 
protect them in the face of local jurisdictions attempting to displace 
crime. Thus, this Article presents an economic justification for the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Opponents of incorporation repeatedly refer to concepts of 
federalism, and the fact that allowing for diversity in the area of crime 
control would allow rules to fit the specific needs of local communities 
and encourage additional experimentation with new policies.1 85 While 
this view raises a valid point, it overlooks other aspects of federalism. 
For one, federalism deals with solving collective-action problems 
within the federation, and as we have seen, states and other localities 
183. See, e.g. , 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 4005/2 (1992) (stating that Illinois authority is 
established for the purpose of "statewide planning"); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 
4413(37), § 7(b)(l) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (requiring Texas authority to create a plan of 
operation to deal with auto theft in "areas of the state where the problems are greatest"). 
This view was also incorporated by many ATPAs into their official policy statements. See, 
e.g., ARIZONA 2003 REPORT, supra note 76, at 2 (listing as part of its mission statement: "To 
deter vehicle theft through a statewide cooperative effort"); N.Y. STATE MOTOR VEHICLE 
THEFT & INS . FRAUD PREVENTION Bo., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, at iv, available at 
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ofpa/pdfdocs/mvtifpannualreport02.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 
2005) (stating in mission statement that the ATPA "shall provide for a coordinated 
approach to curtailing motor vehicle theft and motor vehicle insurance fraud throughout the 
State"). 
184. Martin Pflieger, Auto Thefts Target of Crackdown in Pa., MORNING CALL 
(Allentown), Oct. 15, 1996, at Al (reporting comments made by Roy Miller, executive 
director of the local ATPA); see also Jeanette Krebs, Auto Thefts in State Stall, PATRJOT­
NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), Dec. 1, 1999, at Bl (reporting comment made by Kenneth 
Robinson of the local ATPA). 
185. Justice Harlan has voiced a constant view to that effect. See Baldwin v. New York, 
399 U.S. 1 17, 138 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16-
17 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680-81 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
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might face such a problem when designing their criminal justice 
system. 
In addition, the analysis presented in this Article points out why, as 
a positive matter, we should be skeptical toward the viability of the 
"new federalism" in the area of criminal procedure. New federalism, a 
term coined by Donald Wilkes in the mid-1970s, refers to a line of 
rulings of state supreme courts that used state constitutions to grant 
local criminal defendants rights that went beyond those required by 
the federal constitution.1 86 As we have seen, jurisdictions that impose 
additional constraints on their law enforcement agencies are expected 
to find themselves in a competitive disadvantage compared to other 
j urisdictions. This, in turn, will cause the crime rate to rise, which will 
generate popular demand for adopting stricter policies with respect to 
crime control. Thus, it is not surprising to see that only a decade after 
the publication of his paper, Wilkes voiced serious concern as to the 
development of the new federalism.1 8 7  Two well-publicized indications 
of the dynamics described here occurred in Florida and California, 
where constraints imposed by the state supreme courts on law 
enforcement were overruled by constitutional amendments that 
prohibited state courts from granting criminal defendants rights 
exceeding their minimal federal rights.188 These two examples seem to 
reflect a general trend. Currently, only a distinct minority of states 
grants defendants rights that exceed their federal rights.1 8 9  
The federal courts can play a similar role with respect to regulating 
criminal sanctions by using their authority under the Eighth 
Amendment to strike down cruel and unusual punishments.190 In 
Solem v. Helm,1 91 the Court evaluated a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole imposed on a repeat offender convicted of issuing 
a no-account check for $100.1 92 Striking down the punishment, the 
186. Donald E. Wilkes Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court 
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974). 
187. Donald E. Wilkes Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure in 1984: Death of 
a Phoenix?, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166, 167-68 (Bradley D. 
McGraw ed., 1985) 
188. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. For a review of these 
amendments, see Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits 
of Florida 's "Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 685-722 (1987); Rachel 
A. Van Cleave, A Constitution in Conflict: The Doctrine of Independent State Grounds and 
the Voter lnitiative in California, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 122-26 (1993). 
189. KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 52 (10th ed. 2002). 
190. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII. 
191. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
192 ld. at 281-82. 
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Solem Court held that the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments included a requirement of proportionality between the 
crime and the punishment.1 93 As part of this evaluation, the Court 
compared the punishment at hand with sentences imposed for the 
commission of similar crimes in other jurisdictions.1 94 The Solem 
proportionality analysis is consistent with the role of federal regulators 
presented in this Article. States adopting criminal sanctions that are 
beyond the accepted sanctioning level in other states create a negative 
externality in the form of crime displacement, and the federal 
government should assist the states in solving this collective-action 
problem.1 95 Regrettably, in recent years the Solem holding has slowly 
eroded, and one must question the viability of current challenges to 
extreme incarceration sanctions.1 9 6  The cases that eroded Solem reflect 
the Court's misunderstanding of its role as a federal regulator. In 
Ewing, for instance, Justice O'Connor took notice of the displacement 
effect created by the California three-strike law in question, yet 
viewed this result as a legitimate state interest that justified the law.1 97 
A central planner attempting to deal with negative externalities 
created by members of a federal system of government should have 
rejected this line of reason. 
Viewing the federal legislation dealing with the specific areas 
analyzed in this Article demonstrates that current federal criminal 
policies do not reflect a proper understanding of the federal 
government's role as a central planner with respect to criminal justice. 
In the area of auto theft, for example, following the rise in auto theft 
in general, and the emergence of a new and violent form of the crime, 
carjacking, Congress enacted the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 
("ACTA").1 9 8  The ACTA includes several provisions that can be seen 
as positive steps made by a central planner to coordinate the activity 
193. Id. at 286-88. 
194. Id. at 291-92. 
195. The regulation of criminal sanctions through the proportionality test of the Eighth 
Amendment might have a practical drawback. If states tend to converge quickly to higher 
criminal sanctions, then by the time an Eighth Amendment challenge is litigated through the 
federal court system a historically disproportionate punishment might become 
proportionate. Nonetheless, this practical problem only reflects the under-inclusiveness of 
the Eighth Amendment's proportionality test, and does not undermine its desirability. 
196. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (upholding a California sentence of 
two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for two cases of petty theft); Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 1 1  (2003) (upholding a California twenty-five years to life sentence for 
stealing merchandise valued at approximately $1,200); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 
(1991) (upholding a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a first time offender 
convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine). 
197. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 27. 
198. Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
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of the states. For instance, encouraging states to participate in the 
creation of a national motor vehicle title registration system reflects an 
effort to promote projects creating positive externalities.1 9 9  Yet the 
ACTA adopts a more problematic approach toward the federal 
regulation of state resources spent on fighting auto theft. More 
precisely, the ACT A conditions states' eligibility for federal grants on 
the creation of a state ATPA much like Michigan's.200 As we have 
seen, however, the prospect of crime displacement provides sufficient 
incentives for states to create such entities, and it is not clear why the 
federal government is encouraging the adoption of local policies that 
create negative externalities. In this situation, a central planner should 
try to reduce the excessive motivation states have in displacing auto 
theft by, for example, conditioning federal grants on staying below a 
certain cap on the surcharge states can impose to fund their ATP As. 
Turning to the area of ex post displacement of criminals, the Jacob 
Wetterling Act again reflects a misunderstanding of the proper role of 
the federal government in designing crime-prevention policies. The 
Act is structured under the premise that states have insufficient 
incentives to enact effective SORNLs and therefore includes 
minimum requirements that states must live up to.201 Given the 
evidence presented here, there is no reason to assume that states will 
have insufficient incentives to enact notification laws, which primarily 
serve the interests of local communities.202 To the contrary, states have 
an incentive to adopt strict notification provisions in order to generate 
sex offender migration. Thus, the appropriate federal policy in this 
context, much like in other NIMBY-type situations, is to adopt a 
unified federal framework that has maximum standards. 203 This 
199. See 49 U.S.C. § 30502-03 (2000). 
200. 42 u.s.c. § 3750b (2000). 
201. Megan's Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 572 (Jan. 5, 
1999) (noting that "[t]he Wettlerling Act generally sets out minimum standards for state sex 
offender registration programs"). 
202. This might not be the case with respect to registration requirements. With respect 
to registration one might assume that there are positive externalities for the efforts of each 
individual state in the form of a comprehensive data set that can serve all states. This is 
especially true given the creation of a federal sex offender database. See 42 U.S.C. § 14072 
(2000) (establishing a federal sex offender database). Hence, imposing minimal federal 
requirements in that context might be a sensible policy. 
203. See Revesz, supra note 12, at 1219 n.24 (noting that "the solution to NIMBY 
problems is federal maximum standards (federal ceilings), which would pre-empt more 
stringent but not less stringent state standards"). At least one commentator has suggested 
the adoption of a unified federal scheme dealing with sex offender registration and 
notification. See Julia A. Houston, Note, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added 
Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV. 729, 764-65 (1994). Houston rests her 
argument on what can be termed as economies of scale of a federal system rather than on 
the problems associated with state competition analyzed in the text above. 
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framework should determine issues such as who will be subjected to 
notification, notification methods, and the duration of notification. 
This framework could allow for some forms of local policy innovations 
that diverge from it, yet these innovations should be scrutinized to 
ensure that they are not opportunistic. 
A specific aspect of SORNLs that might generate future litigation 
is registration requirements that target sex offenders who migrate 
from states that require them to register to states that do not. As 
noted above, several states require such offenders to register as sex 
offenders despite the fact that current residents of the state who 
committed identical crimes are not required to do so. 204 From a 
constitutional perspective, these limitations are problematic since 
courts might see them as a violation of offenders' right to travel freely 
from one state to another. The Supreme Court has recognized such a 
constitutional right in a long line of cases. 2 05 Most recently, in Saenz v. 
Roe, the Court evaluated the implications of this right for state 
policies that create differential treatment of new residents. Specifically 
at issue was a California statute limiting the welfare benefits of new 
California residents during their first year of residence in California to 
the level of welfare that they were entitled to in their original state of 
residence. 206 B asing its decision on the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court ruled that all citizens of the 
United States have a right to choose their state of residence and each 
state is obliged to treat them equally. 2 0 7  Furthermore, the Saenz Court 
found this to be a strict requirement and refused to adopt any 
intermediate standard of review to apply to policies that discriminate 
against new residents. 2 0 8  Thus, the Court found the adoption of 
discriminatory policies to prevent migration of welfare applicants to 
be impermissible . 2 0 9  In addition, the Court rejected California's claim 
that the budget savings created by the policy justified its application. 21 0 
Accordingly, the Court struck down the statute and ruled that 
California must provide all of its residents equal welfare benefits. 2 1 1  
In light of the hostile attitude of the Saenz Court towards policies 
aimed at discouraging migration, there seems to be a distinct 
possibility that registration requirements based on previous residence 
204. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text. 
205. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
629-30 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). 
206. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493. 
207. Id. at 502-03. 
208. Id. at 504. 
209. Id. at 506. 
210. Id. at 506-07. 
211. Id. at 507. 
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would similarly be found unconstitutional. Once states do not require 
their own residents who committed identical crimes to register, it is 
difficult to see how they could justify the differential treatment of new 
residents. Arguably these new residents pose no greater risk to the 
public than equivalent local residents. Nonetheless, states wishing to 
def end such policies might be able to distinguish the Saenz ruling in 
two ways. First, Saenz relies on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which lends itself quite naturally to an 
issue such as welfare benefits. It is not clear whether the Court will be 
willing to recognize a constitutional "privilege" not to be included in a 
sex offender registry. Second, the Saenz Court noted that the 
relatively generous welfare benefits granted by California did not 
create any significant migration of welfare recipients to the state.212 
Thus, one could argue that strong empirical evidence supporting the 
sex offender migration hypothesis might cause the Court to reject the 
Saenz approach. 
From the perspective of j urisdictional competition, registration 
requirements based on offenders' previous place of residence are a 
sensible way to prevent a race to the bottom in the area of SORNLs. 
Once a state adopts such a provision, it in effect removes itself from 
the jurisdictional race and is free to adopt any registration policy that 
best reflects its values, with no need to "keep up" with harsh 
conditions adopted by other states. Thus, while such programs might 
seem detrimental to sex offenders (and quite naturally that would 
seem to be the case when a specific out-of-state sex offender brings a 
lawsuit challenging his registration under such a policy) they might 
actually be in the best interest of sex offenders as a group since they 
will allow jurisdictions to adopt more lenient registration 
requirements. 
A piece of federal legislation that attempts to deal with the 
problem of offender displacement is Aimee's Law,213 named after 
Aimee Willard, who was kidnapped, raped, and murdered near 
Philadelphia by a Nevada parolee. Aimee's Law provides that a state 
that convicts an offender of murder, rape, or a dangerous sexual 
offense, who has a prior conviction for any one of those offenses, is 
entitled to a reimbursement of the costs of the incarceration, 
prosecution, and apprehension of that individual from the state that 
previously convicted and released him.214 In addition, the law creates a 
safe harbor for states that impose an average term of imprisonment 
212 Id. at 506. 
213. Aimee's Law, 42 U.S.C. § 13713 (2000). 
214. Id. § 13713(c). More precisely, this reimbursement is achieved by a deduction of 
federal law-enforcement grants that is transferred from state to state. 
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for the relevant offense that is higher than the national-average 
imprisonment for that crime and that kept the individual in question 
incarcerated for at least eighty-five percent of his prison term.215 
Aimee's Law represents a positive step toward causing states to 
internalize the effects of their policies, since it imposes on states at 
least some of the costs of the crime they displace to neighboring states. 
On the other hand, the safe harbor enacted within the law creates yet 
another "race" for states in the context of criminal sanctioning, since 
by adopting and imposing sanctions that are above the national 
average, states are able to reduce their liability under Aimee's Law to 
zero. While this incentive structure might achieve the actual goal of 
the proponents of Aimee's Law, namely, the incarceration of 
offenders convicted of one of the crimes the law deals with for life,216 
this outcome is not necessarily desirable. 
* * *  
In sum, this Part has evaluated the normative aspects of 
jurisdictional competition in the area of criminal justice. The tentative 
conclusion of this discussion is that additional federal regulation in the 
area of criminal justice might be desirable if there is a race to the 
bottom problem. Nevertheless, a caveat should be added. As we have 
seen, current federal legislation in the area of crime control does not 
reflect a proper understanding of the role of the federal government as 
a central planner. Rather, it reflects a "tough on crime" attitude no 
matter what the context of the legislation. If federal lawmakers - for 
whatever institutional, political, or personal reasons - cannot assume 
the role of a rational central planner, the United States criminal justice 
system has little to gain, and perhaps even much to lose, from 
additional federal regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has aimed to point out the unique dynamics that a 
decentralized criminal justice system, such as the one in the United 
States, might create. Using tools of positive public choice theory, I 
have demonstrated that in a decentralized criminal justice system local 
units have an incentive to lower their crime rate by displacing crime to 
neighboring jurisdictions. More specifically, I have identified two ways 
jurisdictions can achieve this goal. The first focuses on ex ante 
215. Id. § 13713( c )(3). 
216. See Aimee's Law, Matthew 's Law, Two Strikes and You're Out Child Protection Act 
and Stop Material Unsuitable for Teens Act: Hearing on H.R. 894, H.R. 4045, H.R. 1989, H.R. 
4047 and H.R. 4147 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong. 23 (2000) (statement of Rep. Matt Salmon). 
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deterrence and aims to increase the expected sanction in any given 
jurisdiction to a level that is higher than that of its neighboring 
jurisdictions. The second focuses on the ex post displacement of 
individuals who have demonstrated by past behavior that they have a 
high propensity to commit crimes. This analysis led to a normative 
discussion according to which the United States might be engaged in a 
race to the bottom in the context of its criminal j ustice system. To the 
extent that this type of race is in fact taking place, this could have 
significant implications as to the role of the federal and state 
governments as regulators in the area of criminal justice. 
Describing the criminal j ustice system as a product of marketplace 
interactions between jurisdictions might run against the intuitions of 
many who view the criminal justice system as a tool that both should, 
and actually does, focus on the infliction of just retribution. Yet, one 
should notice that the argument presented in this Article has little to 
do with the normative goal of the criminal justice system. Rather, this 
Article viewed key elements of the criminal justice system such as the 
desirable size of sanctions and defendants' rights as exogenous, and 
focused on the design of the institutional structures that could help 
fulfill these goals given the competitive forces functioning in the 
market for criminal justice. From this perspective, all that is required 
for the political process described in this Article to take place is that 
deterring and reducing future crime rates be one of the things that 
matters to local politicians. This does not seem to be a far-fetched 
assumption.217 Furthermore, actual crime displacement is not a 
precondition for the validity of the argument made here. As long as 
the public perceives that displacement is caused by increasing 
sanctions, raising the probability of detection, or limiting defendants' 
rights, politicians will be driven to adopt such policies. 
Introducing the concept of the market for criminal justice leaves 
room for substantial future analytical and empirical research. On the 
analytical side, this research should focus on specific aspects of the 
criminal justice system that might be prone to competitive effects. This 
research could track the political forces that drive changes in the wide 
body of criminal doctrine, the criminal process, and evidence law. On 
the empirical side, future work could focus on measuring changes over 
time in the criminal justice system, and measuring the displacement 
217. To be more precise, all that needs to be assumed is that policymakers care to some 
degree about deterrence and crime rates, and that they are willing to trade off between other 
policy goals and those goals. If policymakers hold lexicographic preferences, in which a goal 
like retribution or rehabilitation simply comes first, with no trade-offs in the relevant 
"region" of the graph in policy-goal space, then displacement will not affect the design of the 
criminal justice system. Again, it does not seem to be far-fetched to assume that 
policymakers are willing to make some types of trade-offs when designing a criminal justice 
system. 
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effect of criminal law. Additionally, studies comparing the United 
States with countries that have a national unified criminal justice 
system could shed light on the topics identified in this Article. Only 
after this information is collected will one be able to offer a definitive 
answer to the question: Is the American criminal justice system 
engaged in a race to the top or a race to the bottom? 
